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Civil Procedure
GEORGE MENCIO, JR.*
In 1980 the Supreme Court of Florida adopted comprehen-
sive amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The
author critically examines these amendments and discusses
their probable impact on civil practice in Florida. The author
also surveys and discusses the 1980 legislation and court deci-
sions that have affected or construed the unamended rules.
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I. COURTS, JUDGES, AND ATTORNEYS
A. Jurisdiction of the Courts
The Florida Legislature recently amended section 34.01 of the
Florida Statutes, which describes the subject matter jurisdiction of
the circuit and county courts.' The amendment increases the juris-
dictional amount for actions filed in county courts from $2500 to
$5000, exclusive of interest, costs, and attorney's fees, unless the
circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the action.' In addi-
tion, a county court may now hear all equitable defenses in any
proceeding properly before it.' Because the amendment applies
only to causes of action accruing on or after July 1, 1980,1 however,
there will be two jurisdictional limits for several years.5
Even if a Florida court has subject matter jurisdiction, it may
be precluded from exercising that power by statute. One such stat-
ute is the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA").'
The UCCJA bars Florida courts from making initial determina-
tions, enforcements, or modifications of out-of-state custody de-
crees when the foreign state "assumed jurisdiction under statutory
1. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-165 (amending FLA. STAT. § 34.01(1)(1979)). The Florida Con-
stitution of 1968 provides that circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction of all cases not
vested in the county courts. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b).
2. FLA. STAT. § 34.01(1) (1981); see Kent v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 386 So. 2d
902, 903 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (attorney's fees not included); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Her-
nandez, 377 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (if maximum recovery under insurance policy
less than jurisdictional amount, case should be transferred to county court regardless of
amount of attorney's fees).
3. FLA. STAT. § 34.01(1) (1981).
4. Id.
5. See id. § 95.11 (limitations of actions other than for the recovery of real property);
H. TRAWICK, JR., TRAWICK's FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3-2 (1981 ed.).
6. FLA. STAT. §§ 61.1302-.1348 (1981).
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provisions substantially in accordance with [the] act."' 7 For exam-
ple, in Trujillo v. Trujillo,8 the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, held that the circuit court was required to recognize and
enforce a custody decree that a New York court had rendered in
accordance with the UCCJA. The trial court was "[w]ithout any
jurisdictional basis to entertain modification proceedings, [and]
should have summarily enforced the New York decree."
B. Court Costs
1. ATTORNEY'S FEES
A frequently litigated issue regarding court costs has been the
recovery of attorney's fees. Costs do not include attorney's fees un-
less provided by statute.10 For example, section 57.105 of the Flor-
ida Statutes authorizes a court to "award a reasonable attorney's
fee to the prevailing party in any civil action in which the court
finds that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of
either law or fact raised by the losing party."" In Allen v. Estate
of Dutton,12 the District Court of Appeal, Fifth District, held that
an action must be "clearly devoid of merit both on the facts and
the law" to trigger section 57.105.18
In Allen, a stepdaughter had brought an action against her
stepmother's estate, alleging that she was a beneficiary of a con-
tract between her father and stepmother that had been incorpo-
rated into their respective wills. Because the alleged agreement was
oral, the trial court found that the daughter's claim was without
merit and awarded attorney's fees to the stepmother's estate under
section 57.105. In reversing the trial court's award of fees, the Fifth
District considered the standard for determining awards under the
statute.14 The court stated that a dismissal either on the pleadings
7. Id. § 61.1328.
8. 378 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
9. Id. at 815.
10. See, e.g., Allen v. Estate of Dutton, 384 So. 2d 171, 174 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980);
Giachelti v. Johnson, 308 So. 2d 143, 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).
11. FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (1981).
12. 384 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
13. Id. at 175 (emphasis in original).
14. The court agreed with the appellant's contention that the trial court had no author-
ity to award attorney's fees: "Ordinarily a trial court lacks jurisdiction to award attorney's
fees after a party has filed a notice of appeal from a final judgment, without first obtaining
permission from the appellate court." Id. at 174. Nevertheless, the Fifth District, after ana-
lyzing the legislative intent, determined that "attorney's fees when properly awarded under
section 57.105 may be awarded as part of court costs." Id. (citation omitted). Since a trial
1981]
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or by summary judgment is not enough to invoke the statute's op-
eration.1" The language of the statute, the court held, requires "a
finding of a total or absolute lack of a justiciable issue." 6
2. OTHER COURT COSTS
Court costs, which include the litigation fees imposed by the
state and the expenses incurred in defending or prosecuting an ac-
tion, are generally recoverable by the prevailing party.17 There are,
however, exceptions to this general rule. One such exception is spc-
tion 57.081 of the Florida Statutes, which exempts indigent per-
sons from the payment and prepayment of costs.18 Previously, this
benefit was available to indigent persons holding certificates of in-
solvency only "in the prosecution of the steps in [a] cause of action
as opposed to steps beyond [a] cause of action, i.e., after entry of
judgment."19 In 1980 the legislature amended the controlling stat-
ute,20 which now provides:
Any indigent person who is a party or intervenor in any ju-
dicial or administrative agency proceeding or who initiates such
proceeding shall receive the services of the courts, sheriffs, and
clerks, with respect to such proceedings, without charge. No pre-
payment of costs to any judge, clerk, or sheriff is required in any
action when the party has obtained from the clerk in each pro-
ceeding a certification of indigency, based on an affidavit filed
with him that the applicant is indigent and unable to pay the
charges otherwise payable by law to any of such officers .... "I
Thus, indigents are now apparently exempt from costs in any judi-
cial proceeding, including execution of judgments.
C. Judges
The adoption of rule 1.432 is an important new development
in the doctrine of judicial disqualification.2 2 Subsection (a) pro-
court may award costs not included in the final judgment even after the filing of a notice to
appeal, the award was not reversed on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction.
15. Id. at 175.
16. Id. (emphasis in original).
17. FLA. STAT. § 57.041 (1981).
18. Id. § 57.081.
19. Brinker v. Ludlow, 379 So. 2d 999, 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (construing FLA. STAT.
§ 57.081(1) (1979)).
20. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-348, § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 57.081(1) (Supp. 1980)).
21. FLA. STAT. § 57.081(1) (1981).
22. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.432 (adopted in 391 So. 2d 165, 173 (Fla. 1980)).
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vides that "[any party may move to disqualify the judge assigned
to the action on the grounds provided by statute. '2 The motion
must be made within a reasonable time after the grounds are dis-
covered, must be verified by the movant, and must allege the facts
relied on. 4 The challenged judge may not pass on the truth of the
allegations, but shall adjudicate only the legal sufficiency of the
motion.2 5 No cases have yet been decided under this new
procedural rule.
The supreme court adopted rule 1.432 to unify disqualification
procedures, 26 and in an apparent response to a number of recent
decisions. In In re Estate of Carlton,27 the supreme court, after
hearing oral argument on the merits, found it was without jurisdic-
tion over a petition for a writ of certiorari. Eleven months later,
the petitioners requested a rehearing and asked that the court dis-
qualify Justice Overton from participating in the decision.28 The
petitioners based the disqualification request on sections 38.02 and
38.10 of the Florida Statutes29 and Canon 3C(1) of Florida's Code
of Judicial Conduct.80 The court found that the petitioner's reli-
ance on the statutes was misplaced because they applied only to
trial judges and not to appellate courts.8 1 Noting that the court's
treatment of disqualification cases had been inconsistent in the
past,32 the court adhered to its more recent decisions and held that
"each justice must determine for himself both the legal sufficiency
of a request seeking his disqualification and the propriety of with-
drawing in any particular circumstances." 33
23. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.432(a).
24. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.432(b)-(c).
25. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.432(d).
26. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.432, Committee Note.
27. 378 So. 2d 1212, 1212 (Fla. 1979), recusal denied, 378 So. 2d 1217 (Fla.), cert. de-
nied sub. nom. Hayes v. Rogers, 447 U.S. 922 (1980).
28. The basis of the disqualification petition was Justice Overton's alleged "extremely
close association and friendship" with a member of the law firm that had represented the
respondent in the original estate matter, but not in the certiorari proceeding. 378 So. 2d at
1218.
29. FLA. STAT. §§ 38.02, .10 (1981).
30. FLA. BAR CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3C.
31. 378 So. 2d at 1219.
32. Compare Daytona Beach Racing & Recreation Facilities Dist. v. Volusia County,
372 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1978) and Department of Revenue v. Golder, 322 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975)
and Department of Revenue v. Leadership Hous., Inc., 322 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 805 (1977) (leaving disqualification decision to discretion of challenged jus-
tice) with Ervin v. Collins, 85 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1956) and Ball v. Yates, 158 Fla. 521, 29 So.
2d 729, cert. denied, 322 U.S. 774 (1947) (unchallenged justices rule upon sufficiency of
request).
33. 378 So. 2d at 1216.
1981]
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The court then submitted the petitioners' request directly to
Justice Overton, who refused to disqualify himself because the pe-
tition was untimely and without merit. 4 The Justice noted that a
party generally waives any grounds for judicial disqualification if
he fails to file the petition within a reasonable time. Because the
petitioner knew of the pertinent facts at the time of the initial oral
argument before the supreme court, the eleven-month delay was
unjustified and constituted a waiver of any grounds for objection."
Considering the merits of the disqualification petition, which al-
leged that Justice Overton had a close association with a member
of the law firm representing the respondent, the Justice com-
mented: "If friendship alone with a lawyer or member of a firm is a
basis for disqualification, then most judges in rural and semi-rural
areas and many in metropolitan areas would be subject to disquali-
fication in a large number of cases."" Remarking further that the
lawyer in question was neither counsel of record nor the principal
representative in the respondent's other legal matters, Justice
Overton concluded that neither the law nor the judicial canons of
ethics mandated his disqualification. Thereafter, the full court re-
jected the petition for rehearing. 3
Not only is section 38.10 inapplicable to appellate judges, but
according to the District Court of Appeal, First District, the stat-
ute applies only to disqualification proceedings initiated before
trial. In Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Mobil Oil Co.,"3 the court sev-
ered certain issues from the main action for separate adjudication.
At issue were rights in offshore drilling leases on state-owned land.
After the trial on the main action, the trial judge announced the
substance of his ruling, and gave the parties an opportunity to
comment on the form of the order. Four days later, the appellant
and the State of Florida jointly requested the judge's recusal be-
cause of his prejudicial statements regarding the unadjudicated is-
sues. Although the judge agreed to recuse himself with respect to
those issues, he entered final judgment on the adjudicated ques-
tions.3 9 The First District affirmed the judgment, concluding that
section 38.10 pertains only to disqualification requests made before
34. Id. at 1218.
35. Id. at 1218-19.
36. Id. at 1220.
37. Justice Overton joined the 4-3 majority. Id. at 1220.
38. 378 So. 2d 336, 337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
39. Id. at 337.
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trial, and not to those made after trial. 0
In Pistorino v. Ferguson,1 the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, reversed the denial of a motion to recuse in a divorce ac-
tion, even though the motion was technically deficient. During a
hearing in which the trial court had awarded temporary custody of
the couple's children to their father, the trial judge remarked to
the wife's attorney: "[Y]our client is not playing with a full deck.
Personally, I think she is crazy, and I will recuse myself anytime
you want me to."4 2 When the husband subsequently petitioned for
permanent custody, the wife's attorney moved to recuse the trial
judge, asserting that the judge had admitted that he could not be
impartial.4 3 The trial court denied the motion because it was un-
timely under section 38.10 of the Florida Statutes, and counsel
had failed to file a good faith certificate and corroborating affida-
vits. On appeal, the Third District distinguished earlier cases
which had held that the failure to follow procedural requirements
bars relief, and ruled that when patent prejudice is apparent, a
judge should disqualify himself." In so holding, the Pistorino court
may have rendered the procedural safeguards of section 38.10 su-
perfluous by approving a method of judicial disqualification that
does not satisfy the statutory requirements."
Another significant decision addressed the issue whether there
should be a different standard of disqualification in jury trials from
that employed in nonjury trials. In Marlin v. Williams,47 the trial
judge, upon defendant's motion, agreed to recuse himself if the
parties tried the case without a jury. The plaintiff had served as a
clerk of the trial court for many years and the judge had previously
excused himself from presiding over the plaintiff's divorce proceed-
ings because of the longstanding acquaintance. Finding no basis for
40. Id.
41. 386 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
42. Id. at 66.
43. Id.
44. FLA. STAT. § 38.10 (1981).
45. The court announced that "[w]hen the requirements of the statute are met, the
necessity of proving that the judge is . . . prejudiced is obviated. But where the record, as
here, reflects that the judge is in fact prejudiced, the necessity of utilizing the statute is
obviated." 386 So. 2d at 67 (footnote omitted).
46. The Third District could have based its decision on a principle of justifiable reli-
ance by the wife, or estoppel against the judge. Instead, the determinative issue was appar-
ently whether the wife had made a showing of prejudice in the record. Henceforth, if a
motion for disqualification does not comply with the statutory requirements, the court must
examine the record to determine the existence of prejudice in fact.
47. 385 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
19811 861
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recusation in a jury trial, however, the judge denied the defen-
dant's motion and entered judgment for the plaintiff. The District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed, stating that once the
judge agreed to recuse himself in a nonjury trial, he erred by fail-
ing to recuse himself from the jury trial. The court remarked that
a judge's conduct must meet "the same high standard of neutral-
ity" in both cases.4 e Marlin thus establishes a single standard for
recusal in the Fourth District.
D. Attorneys
Two 1980 cases considered the effect of contractual agree-
ments among parties and their attorneys on a subsequent award to
a party of "reasonable attorney's fees." In Trustees of Cameron-
Brown Investment Group v. Tavormina," the trial court awarded
attorney's fees to a group of lenders that had sued to foreclose on a
usurious construction loan, but excluded amounts attributable to
the time spent on the usury issue. 0 The promissory notes obli-
gated the borrowers to pay the costs of collection, including a rea-
sonable attorney's fee. Trial testimony suggested that a reasonable
fee might exceed $100,000." Under a fee contract between the
lenders and their attorney, however, the lenders' actual fee expense
was less than $25,000. The trial court awarded attorney's fees in
the amount actually expended, and the lenders appealed.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, upheld the fee
award. First, it agreed with the trial court that the lenders were
not entitled to reimbursement for fees expended in their attempt
to enforce the usurious loan provisions. 2 Second, the court sum-
marily rejected the lenders' contention that allowing the borrowers
to profit by the lenders' advantageous fee arrangement violated the
collateral source rule.53 Third, the court rejected the lenders' claim
that they were entitled to "reasonable" fees, irrespective of their
arrangements with counsel. The court stated:
48. Id. at 1031.
49. 385 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
50. Id. at 729.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. The court characterized the collateral source rule as a doctrine of tort law "devel-
oped to prevent a tortfeasor's avoidance of the civil punishment meted out for his wrongdo-
ing." Id. While noting that the laws of tort and contract often blend, the court observed that
the collateral source rule does not apply to a contract case because the measure of damages
is the plaintiffs injury, not the defendant's culpability.
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The first question a trial court must answer when faced
with a demand for attorneys' fees is not what a reasonable fee
might be in the absence of any fee contract between the claim-
ing party and his attorney, but whether the actual fee agree-
ment against which the claimant seeks indemnity is unreason-
able: Specifically, whether the agreement is excessive, under the
terms of the Fla. Bar. Code Prof. Resp., D.R. 2-106(B). If the fee
is not excessive, and it is enforcible by both parties thereto, that
fee should be awarded. If the fee is excessive, then the court
should proceed to the determination of a "reasonable" fee, i.e., a
quantum meruit fee, based on the same factors it considered
when it evaluated the fee contract.
Contractual provision for reasonable attorney's fees is en-
forcible as an agreement for indemnification; an award based on
such a provision is properly limited to the reasonable (read:
nonexcessive) expense actually incurred by the obligee thereun-
der: A party contractually entitled to his attorney's fees may re-
cover the amount he must pay his lawyer, or a reasonable fee,
whichever is lower. 5 4
The court expressly limited its holding, however, to those in-
stances in which contracts exist both between the parties and be-
tween a party and his counsel.5 The court also expressly excluded
from its holding fees authorized by statute because of public policy
considerations."
Earlier in the same year, the District Court of Appeal, Fifth
District, ruled in R.W. King Construction Co. v. City of Mel-
bourne57 that a statute limiting an award of attorney's fees does
not normally prevent parties from specifically contracting to ex-
ceed that limit. The defendants, a contractor and its surety, ap-
pealed a final judgment in favor of the city awarding $49,131.94 for
breach of a construction contract and $21,700 for attorneys' fees.
The appellants challenged the fee award, claiming, inter alia, that
the court's ruling was contrary to section 627.756 of the Florida
Statutes, which, in cases involving sureties, limits recovery to
twelve and one-half percent of the final judgment.58
54. Id. at 731.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 384 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
58. FLA. STAT. § 627.756 (1981) provides:
Section 627.428 (attorney fee) shall also apply as to suits brought by owners...
against a surety insurer under payment or performance bonds written by the
insurer under the laws of Florida to indemnify such owners ... against pecuni-
19811
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The court found that the fee award was proper because the
construction contract provided that the contractor and its surety
would indemnify the city for costs, expenses, and damages arising
from or in connection with any default by the contractor, including
litigation costs and attorney's fees.59 Construing the obligation to
include the payment of reasonable attorney's fees, the court held
that the statute did not create a ceiling on fees and that "parties
are free to contract for reasonable attorney fees rather than statu-
tory attorney fees."60
II. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
a. Appearances
Martino v. Florida Insurance Guaranty Ass'n,s' illustrates the
rule that a party who files a general appearance in an action, inten-
tionally or otherwise, gives a court jurisdiction over his person
without formal service of process. In Martino, the Florida Insur-
ance Guaranty Association ("FIGA") s filed a notice of appearance
and moved to set aside a default judgment previously entered in
favor of an insured against an insolvent insurance company. After
the trial court denied the motion, FIGA refused to pay the judg-
ment and did not appeal. In a subsequent action by the insured to
enforce the default judgment against FIGA, the trial court ruled
that FIGA was not responsible for the judgment. On appeal, the
District Court of Appeal, Third District, reversed. Noting that
FIGA had waived the need for service of process by appearing in
the previous action," the court held that the default judgment
bound FIGA because FIGA had participated in the proceeding af-
ter the insurance company had become insolvent.6
A party who files an appearance before challenging personal
ary loss by breach of a building or construction contract; except that the amount
to be so recovered for fees or compensation of such a plaintiffs attorney shall
not be more than 12.5 percent of the amount which the judgment or decree
awards such plaintiff under the bond ....
59. 384 So. 2d at 655.
60. Id.
61. 383 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
62. FIGA is a nonprofit corporation created by statute, FLA. STAT. § 631.55 (1981), to
insure the obligations of insolvent insurance companies on covered claims. Id. § 631.57.
63. 383 So. 2d 943 n.2 (citing Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union
v. Lake Buena Vista Communities, Inc., 349 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) and Royal
Indus., Inc. v. Birdsong, 340 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), cert. denied, 351 So. 2d 408
(Fla. 1977)).
64. 383 So. 2d at 94.
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jurisdiction gives a court power to render a personal judgment. In
Fulmer v. Northern Central Bank,65 the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, held that the filing of a document titled "Notice
of Appearance" was "a general appearance which subjected appel-
lee to the jurisdiction of the trial court.""6 Although the court held
that the appellee's explanation of the document could not over-
come the effect of its wording, the court noted in dictum that "[a]
general appearance entered after an assertion of lack of personal
jurisdiction would not waive any alleged jurisdictional defect. ''" 7
The Second District in White v. Nicholson6" applied the rule
it had enunciated in dictum in Fulmer. In White, an insurance car-
rier filed a motion on behalf of its insured to quash substituted
service of process. 9 The insured's attorney subsequently entered a
notice of appearance. The trial judge ruled that the notice was a
waiver of the insured's objections to personal jurisdiction. The Sec-
ond District reversed, noting that the insured had objected to ser-
vice of process before filing the appearance. Thus, the insured had
not violated the rule that "[a] defendant may not make a general
appearance and later repudiate it by attacking the court's jurisdic-
tion over him."'70
B. Implied Consent
Jurisdictional issues frequently arise in domestic relations
cases. In Walsh v. Walsh,7 1 a Florida resident obtained a divorce
decree in 1965 after having served her nonresident husband by
publication. The decree incorporated a property settlement agree-
ment that both parties had executed. 2 The wife sought to enforce
65. 386 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
66. Id. at 857-58 n.2 (citing Royal Indus., Inc. v. Birdsong, 340 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1st DCA
1976), cert. denied, 351 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1977)). The document stated that counsel "hereby
enters his appearance on behalf of Northern Central Bank as Trustee in the above refer-
enced cause." Id. at 857 n.2.
67. Id. at 858 n.3 (emphasis in original).
68. 386 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
69. FLA. STAT. § 48.171 (1981).
70. 386 So. 2d at 75. The Nicholson court compared the defendant's preservation of the
jurisdictional challenge to the facts of Green v. Roth, 192 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). In
Green, the plaintiff filed both a complaint and a notice of lis pendens. The defendant
corporation first challenged service of process and then moved to discharge the lis pendens
and increase a bond. In reversing the lower court, the Second District held that because the
corporate defendant "promptly raised the question of jurisdiction over its person," it had
not submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court by proceeding to litigate the other mat-
ters. Id. at 539.
71. 388 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
72. Id. at 241.
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the agreement's support provisions in 1978, and served the hus-
band personally under Florida's long arm statute.7 3 The husband
challenged the court's jurisdiction over him, contending that he
had never resided in Florida. The trial court agreed and dismissed
the wife's claim for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed, al-
though it agreed with the trial court that because the husband had
never resided in Florida, personal service under sections 48.193
and 48.194 of the Florida Statutes74 was inappropriate. Acknowl-
edging that the trial court needed personal jurisdiction in order to
enforce the settlement agreement's support provisions, the Second
District noted that the final clause provided that "[tihis agree-
ment, if acceptable to the Court, may be incorporated by reference
in any judgment or decree so obtained. ' ' "7 From this provision, the
court reasoned that the husband had consented to personal juris-
diction for the purpose of enforcing the agreement:7"
Surely the primary purpose of the parties' agreeing to incorpo-
rate the agreement was to allow a court to enforce it. On incor-
porating the agreement the court elevated it to the dignity and
effect of a court decree, which it then had continuing jurisdic-
tion to enforce .... Since a court can enforce monetary obliga-
tions against a person's property located inside the boundaries
of the state in which it sits without having jurisdiction over the
person, there was no reason for the husband to consent to this
type of enforcement .... It follows, therefore, that the husband
was consenting to enforcement against his property located
outside of the boundaries of the state in which the enforcing
court sits, and was consenting to personal jurisdiction on con-
structive service for that type of enforcement.7
C. Long Arm Jurisdiction
1. MINIMUM CONTACTS
No state court can constitutionally exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant who has not established certain
minimum contacts with the state . The inquiry whether sufficient
73. FLA. STAT. § 48.194 (1981).
74. Id. §§ 48.193-.194.
75. 388 So. 2d at 241.
76. Id. at 242.
77. Id. at 242 (citations omitted).
78. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Godfrey v. Neumann, 373 So. 2d 920 (Fla.
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contacts exist to bring a nonresident within the state's jurisdiction
is twofold. First, the nonresident's activities in the forum state
must be within the provisions of the state's long arm statute. Sec-
ond, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident de-
fendant must safisy the due process reasonableness requirements
of the federal and state constitutions.
In Osborn v. University Society, Inc.,79 a case decided before
the adoption of rule 1.070(i) of the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,80 the District Court of Appeal, Second District, declined to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a New York corporation. The
complaint alleged that the corporate defendant had breached a
consulting contract that contained no provision regarding the place
of payment.81 The plaintiff contended that the corporation's non-
performance of its obligation to pay the plaintiff in Florida satis-
fied the requirements of section 48.193(1)(g) of the Florida Stat-
utes.82 The statute provides that a nonresident who "breaches a
contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the
contract to be performed in this state" is subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the Florida courts.as
Although the complaint's jurisdictional allegations technically
complied with the wording of section 48.193(1)(g), the Second Dis-
trict observed that the "plaintiff may not constitutionally apply
the statute to obtain jurisdiction in the absence of the requisite
minimum contacts with the forum state."84 The court concluded
that the corporation had not been "availing itself of the privilege
of conducting activities in Florida. '85 Moreover, executing a con-
tract with a Florida resident who is to perform "services at an un-
specified location is an insufficient contact with Florida upon
which to predicate jurisdiction." 86
Lakewood Pipe, Inc. v. Rubaii87 also dealt with personal juris-
diction under section 48.193(1)(g). 8 The plaintiff, Rubaii, entered
1979) (commission of tort under FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(b) (1981)).
79. 378 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
80. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.070(i); see notes 114-24 and accompanying text infra.
81. 378 So. 2d at 874.
82. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(g) (1981).
83. Id.
84. 378 So. 2d at 874 (citing Harlo Prods. Corp. v. J.I. Case Co., 360 So. 2d 1328 (Fla.
1st DCA 1978) and Jack Pickard Dodge, Inc. v. Yarbrough, 352 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA
1977)).
85. 378 So. 2d at 874.
86. Id.
87. 379 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
88. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(g) (1981).
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into a brokerage agreement with a Florida pipe distributor in
which Rubaii was to obtain export contracts from the Middle East.
The distributor subsequently executed a contract with Iraq to sup-
ply pipe casing. This contract did not mention the broker. Shortly
before becoming bankrupt, the Florida distributor assigned its
Iraqi contract to Lakeland, a Texas company also engaged in the
distribution of pipe casing. The two distributors executed the as-
signment in Texas. Rubaii sued Lakeland under its agreement to
pay all brokerage commissions stemming from the Iraqi supply
contract. 9 The trial court subjected Lakeland to Florida in per-
sonam jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(g), which pertains to
breaches of contracts calling for performance in Florida by
nonresidents.90
The brokerage agreement, as did the consulting contract in
Osborn v. University Society, Inc.,91. had no provision regarding
the place of payment. Rubaii contended that, because both he and
the Florida corporation were residents of the state and had exe-
cuted the agreement in Florida, the assignment of the Iraqi con-
tract obligated Lakeland to pay Rubaii in Florida. The District
Court of Appeal, Second District, rejected this reasoning because
Lakeland's alleged obligation was too tenuous to satisfy the mini-
mum contacts test.92 Rubaii was "merely . . .a gratuitous benefi-
ciary of a guarantee" undertaken in another state."' Unless Rubaii
could plead additional factual allegations regarding Lakeland's
contacts with Florida on remand, Florida would not have jurisdic-
tion under section 48.193(1):"' "Even where there is facial jurisdic-
tion under the Florida long arm statute, the party over which juris-
diction is asserted must have had sufficient minimum contacts
with Florida to satisy due process requirements." 95
The plaintiff in Life Laboratories, Inc. v. Valdes" sought to
invoke Florida's long arm jurisdiction against a foreign pharmaceu-
tical manufacturer in a products liability action before the adop-
tion of rule 1.070(i) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. 7 The
District Court of Appeal, Third District, declined to apply section
89. 379 So. 2d at 476.
90. Id. at 477.
91. 378 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
92. 379 So. 2d at 477-78.
93. Id. at 478.
94. Id.; see notes 114-24 and accompanying text infra.
95. 379 So. 2d at 477.
96. 387 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
97. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.070(i).
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48.193(i)(f)2 of the Florida Statutes."8 This provision subjects any
manufacturer whose product injures a consumer within the state to
in personam jurisdiction in Florida. According to the court, the
complaint failed to allege any facts that established "that Life
Laboratories knew or had any specific reason to anticipate that its
products would be shipped in interstate commerce so that it would
foreseeably injure a Florida user."99 The defendant, Life Laborato-
ries, had only manufactured the product for another company and
evidently had made none of the "marketing, advertising, or distri-
bution decisions."100 The court concluded that -Life Laboratories
had not purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting in
Florida. "In construing section 48.193(1)(f)2, a nexus more sub-
stantial than a mere possibility that a product might reach this
state must be pled and, if controverted, overcome."101 In short, this
case, Osborn,0'" and Lakeland Pipe,108 demonstrate that prior to
the adoption of rule 1.070(i), the minimum contacts standard
placed a higher pleading burden on the plaintiff than did section
48.193.
In A.B.L. Realty Corp. v. Cohlr4 the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, dealt with an action brought against a New York
corporation that had sold a Florida condominium to two Michigan
residents. Although the parties had signed the contract in Michi-
gan, they conducted the closing in Miami Beach. The purchasers
sued the corporation following the imposition of a lien on their
condominium for liabilities incurred before the closing.' 0 ' Rather
than proceeding under Florida's long arm statute, section 48.193 of
the Florida Statutes,10 6 the purchasers elected to obtain personal
jurisdiction over the corporation under section 48.181(1), an alter-
native statute that authorizes parties to serve complaints on the
Secretary of State.o7 Both sections 48.181(1) and 48.193(1)(a) of
the Florida Statutes subject nonresidents who operate, conduct,
engage in, or carry on "a business or business venture" in the state
98. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(f)2 (1981).
99. 387 So. 2d at 1011.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Osborn v. University Soc'y, Inc., 378 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
103. Lakeland Pipe, Inc. v. Rubaii, 379 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
104. 384 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
105. Id. at 1352.
106. FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (1981).
107. Id. § 48.181(1).
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to Florida in personam jurisdiction. 0 8 Section 48.193, however,
does not provide for substituted service.
The Fourth District, using the criteria it had developed in
Horace v. American National Bank & Trust Co.,109 concluded that
the corporate defendant, A.B.L. Realty, engaged in a business ven-
ture in Florida. The corporation's "name . . . implies that it is a
business entity which derives profit from dealing in real estate."110
The acquisition and sale of the condominium "evidence a volun-
tary intent to act within the State." ' In addition, the property's
location and the presence at the closing of the Florida attorney
who represented the corporation "justify resort to Florida courts to
insure the integrity of the transfer."' 2 The court, however, de-
clined to exercise personal jurisdiction over the two A.B.L. execu-
tives whom the purchasers had named. The allegations of the com-
plaint failed to establish that, under section 48.181(1), either
executive had "engaged in a business or business venture" in Flor-
ida as individuals. "
2. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS
Rule 1.070(i) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure became
effective on January 1, 1981.11" Before then, a number of Florida
appellate decisions sanctioned the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident only if the complaint alleged enough facts to
satisfy the minimum contacts doctrine. A plaintiff had the burden
of establishing the appropriateness of long arm jurisdiction, which
required setting forth the ultimate, as opposed to the evidentiary,
facts. Cases such as Osborn v. University Society, Inc.," Lake-
wood Pipe, Inc. v. Rubaii,"6 and Life Laboratories, Inc. v.
Valdes 17 are illustrative of the former pleading requirements.
Subsection (i) of rule 1.070 provides, "When service of process
is to be made under statutes authorizing service on nonresidents of
Florida, it is sufficient to plead the basis for service in the language
108. Id. §§ 48.181(1), .193(1)(a).
109. 251 So. 2d 33, 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).
110. 384 So. 2d at 1355.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1356.
114. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.070(i) (adopted in 391 So. 2d 165, 165-66 (Fla. 1980)).
115. 378 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
116. 379 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
117. 387 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
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of the statute without pleading the facts supporting service.""' 8 Ac-
cording to the accompanying Committee Note, the rule was
added . . . to eliminate pleading evidentiary facts for "long
arm" service of process .... [P]leading the basis for service is
sufficient if it is done in the language of the statute. . . The
amendment is limited to pleading. If the statutory allegations
are attacked by motion, the pleader must then prove the eviden-
tiary facts to support the statutory requirements."'
As one court noted, under the amended rule, "general and con-
clusory jurisdictional allegations" will no longer be "entirely insuf-
ficient" as a basis for predicating in personam jurisdiction. 20
The adoption of rule 1.070(i) is likely to have little practical
impact on pleading practice. The Supreme Court of Florida in-
tended to eliminate a trap for unwary plaintiffs. Complaints will
continue to track the language of section 48.193 of the Florida
Statutes1 21 and contain only general factual allegations. Motions to
dismiss will continue to incorporate affidavits that rebut the plain-
tiff's allegations and present additional facts designed to preclude
the assertion of other jurisdictional bases. Under the new rule, a
plaintiff can submit supporting affidavits, rather than being con-
fined to the complaint's factual and jurisdictional allegations.
Nevertheless, this change in the rule is certain to cause some
litigation. The absence of factual allegations may make it impossi-
ble for a court to exercise jurisdiction on due process grounds be-
cause of the minimum contacts requirement. 122 Furthermore, a de-
fault judgment predicated on a limited record may be more
susceptible to collateral attack in another state.
Rule 1.070(i), which applies only to service of process on non-
residents of Florida, has two important limitations: First, the rule
does not apply to allegations that support constructive service of
process under chapter 49 of the Florida Statutes involving in rem
or quasi in rem jurisdiction. 23 Chapter 49 does not enumerate the
acts that support jurisdiction, nor is it confined to nonresidents.
Second, the rule does not apply to substituted service of process on
a Florida resident who "conceals his whereabouts.' ' 2 4 These limita-
118. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.070(i).
119. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.070(i), Committee Note.
120. Weatherhead Co. v. Coletti, 392 So. 2d 1342, 1345 & n.8 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
121. FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (1981).
122. See generally cases cited notes 115-17 supra.
123. FLA. STAT. ch. 49 (1981).
124. See FLA. STAT. §§ 48.161(1), .181(1) (1981).
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tions require plaintiffs to follow preexisting pleading procedures.
3. SERVICE OF PROCESS ON NONRESIDENTS
Another facet of Florida's long arm jurisdiction statutes and
their pleading requirements concerns the subtle, but significant,
ramifications of serving process under either section 48.181 or sec-
tion 48.193 of the Florida Statutes.12 5 Since 1973 plaintiffs have
had the option of obtaining in personam jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents by either personal or substituted service of process. If an of-
ficial in a foreign jurisdiction personally serves a nonresident under
section 48.194,126 the cause of action must stem from an act enu-
merated in section 48.193 that the nonresident allegedly commit-
ted in Florida.1 2 7 If, however, the Secretary of State receives the
summons and complaint, the plaintiff is presumably proceeding
under section 48.181.
A.B.L. Realty Corp. v. Cohl12s illustrates the principle that the
method of service affects the analysis of the complaint's jurisdic-
tional allegations. The plaintiffs, Michigan residents, had pur-
chased a Florida condominium from a New York corporation. Fol-
lowing the imposition of liens on their property, the plaintiffs
acquired jurisdiction over the foreign corporation and two of its
executives by substituted service of process through the Secretary
of State. 29
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, observed that
"[the allegations in the complaint suggest that plaintiffs might
have proceeded under either [section 48.191 or 48.193]. " "130 Because
the plaintiffs had elected to use substituted service, the court con-
125. FLA. STAT. §§ 48.181, .193 (1981).
126. Id. § 48.194.
127. Id. § 48.193(2), (3). For a discussion of the interrelationship of subsections (1), (2),
and (3) of FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (1981), see Soule v. Rosasco-Soule, 386 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1980), in which the estranged wife of a Virginia resident initiated divorce proceedings
in Florida. A Virginia sheriff served process on the husband under FLA. STAT. § 48.194
(1981). Although the couple had resided in Florida from 1934 to 1938, the District Court of
Appeal, First District, refused to exercise personal jurisdiction because it read subsection (3)
of FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (1981) "in pari materia" with subsection (1)(e):
[R]esidency is sufficient to give this state personal jurisdiction only if the cause
of action arises from that residency. There is nothing in the allegations of the
complaint in this case that there were any acts or omissions arising out of the
Florida residency on which the action of [the wife] is based.
386 So. 2d at 863.
128. 384 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); see notes 104-08 and accompanying text
supra.
129. 384 So. 2d at 1353.
130. Id.
[Vol. 35:855
CIVIL PROCEDURE
cluded that it must "limit [its] review to the perspective of section
48.181 and look to see whether plaintiffs have shown that defen-
dants carried on or engaged in a business or business venture
within the state." 131 This initial step in the court's reasoning had
little effect on the amenability of the foreign corporation to Florida
long arm jurisdiction because the engaging in "a business or busi-
ness venture" language in both sections 48.181(1) and 48.193(1)(a)
is nearly identical."3 2 The court, however, declined to exercise in
personam jurisdiction over the two executives: the "complaint con-
tains no allegation that either party, individually, as opposed to
acting in their corporate capacities, engaged in a business or a bus-
iness venture in Florida."''8 In order to sustain the allegation of
fraud against the executives, the plaintiffs should have proceeded
under section 48.193(1)(b), pertaining to the commission of torts
within the state.1
4
III. VENUE
A. Statutory Requirements
Venue statutes specify the geographical locations in which
parties may file actions.'3 5 Florida's general venue statute, section
47.011 of the Florida Statutes, provides that "[aictions shall be
brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the
cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is lo-
cated."' 36 The Supreme Court of Florida recently upheld the con-
stitutionality of section 47.011 in Florida Public Service Commis-
sion v. Triple "A" Enterprises, Inc.,'3 7 a case that reached the
supreme court by petition for writ of certiorari to review a circuit
court's interlocutory order. 8 8 In Triple "A" Enterprises, the Pub-
lic Service Commission ("PSC") had ordered household movers to
cease their operations until the movers obtained proper authoriza-
tion from the Commission. The movers, in turn, sought declaratory
131. Id.
132. Compare FLA. STAT. § 48.181(1) (1981) (acceptance of the privilege "to operate,
conduct, engage in, or carry on a business venture in the State") with FLA. STAT. §
48.193(1)(a) (1981) (person who "operates, conducts, engages in, or carries on a business or
business venture in this State").
133. 384 So. 2d at 1355.
134. Id. at 1355-56.
135. H. TRAWICK, JR., supra note 5, § 5-1.
136. FLA. STAT. § 47.011 (1981). The statute does not apply to nonresidents.
137. 387 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 1980).
138. Id. at 941.
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and injunctive relief against the PSC in the Circuit Court for Mar-
tin County. The PSC filed a motion for change of venue, arguing
that it had a common-law privilege to seek venue in the county of
its headquarters. "' The circuit court denied the motion, holding
that section 47.011 of the Florida Statutes140 and the body of case
law establishing a venue privilege for the PSC were unconstitu-
tional.1 4 1 On appeal, the supreme court reversed. First, the court
concluded that the common-law venue privilege met all "funda-
mental requirements of due process" and promoted "efficient and
uniform rulings.' ' 4 2 The court then found that the "sword-wielder
doctrine," which is an exception to the common-law privilege, did
not apply in this case.14 8 Noting that the sword-wielder doctrine
"applies only where direct judicial protection is sought from an un-
lawful invasion of a constitutional right of the plaintiff, directly
threatened in the county where the suit is instituted,' ' 4 4 the court
found that the PSC's alleged threat to the plaintiff's rights was
neither real nor immediate. Since the venue statute was constitu-
tional and the sword-wielder doctrine did not apply, the trial court
had erred in denying the PSC's motion for change of venue.
Section 47.051 of the Florida Statutes, which governs venue in
actions against corporations, provides in part, that "[a]ctions
against foreign corporations doing business in this state shall be
brought in a county where such corporation has an agent or other
representative, where the cause of action accrued, or where the
property in litigation is located."'4M Finding that the statute failed
to specify the venue for suits against foreign corporations not qual-
ified to transact business in Florida, the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, held in Cleveland Compania Maritima, S.A. Pan-
ama v. Logothetis"6 that the plaintiff could bring an action in any
139. The common-law rule is that "[a]bsent waiver or exception in civil actions brought
against the state, its agencies or subdivisions, venue properly lies in the county of its princi-
pal headquarters." Id. at 942.
140. FLA. STAT. § 47.011 (1981).
141. The trial court relied on FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21, which provides that "[t]he courts
shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered
without sale, denial or delay." The lower court also found that the requested change of
venue would have caused an unconstitutional delay in the administration of justice. 387 So.
2d at 943.
142. 387 So. 2d at 943.
143. Id. at 942.
144. Id.
145. FLA. STAT. § 47.051 (1981).
146. 378 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
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county in which the court could obtain jurisdiction. 4 7
In Cleveland, an employee brought a personal injury suit
against his employer, a Panamanian shipping company, in Hills-
borough County. The employee was injured while unloading his
employer's ship in Lee County, Florida. Although the ship regu-
larly stopped in Miami, it had only stopped on the west coast of
Florida three times in the two years preceding the injury. " 8 The
Second District concluded that this activity was sufficient to meet
the "doing business" requirement of section 47.051 of the Florida
Statutes. " 9 Although the court declined to address whether "doing
business" under the venue statute was tantamount to "carries on a
business" under either the jurisdiction or service of process stat-
utes, 50 it held that the corporation's Florida activities met both
standards. After finding that the corporation had an agent in Hills-
borough County, the district court held that venue was not
improper.' 5 '
B. Transfers and Dismissals
Under rules 1.060(b) and 1.140(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure,'52 a party waives the right to contest venue if he files a
motion to dismiss without raising the issue. Accordingly, in Gross
v. Franklin,'15 the District Court of Appeal, Third District, re-
jected the defendant's first contention that his failure to allege im-
proper venue in his motion to dismiss did not waive his right to
have the cause transferred under rule 1.060(b).'5 Instead, the
court agreed with the defendant's second contention that his mo-
tion to transfer venue was timely because he had filed it before the
trial court heard argument on his motion to dismiss. 55 The court
reasoned that the defendant was not engaging in dilatory tactics:
"dilatoriness does not exist where separate motions raising Rule
1.140(b) defenses are filed before hearing is held on any such
147. Id. at 1338.
148. Id. at 1337-38.
149. FLA. STAT. § 47.051 (1981).
150. See id. §§ 48.181, .193.
151. 378 So. 2d at 1339.
152. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.060(b), .140(b). The supreme court amended rule 1.060(b) in 1980
to delete references to justice of the peace districts. In re Rules of Civil Procedure, 391 So.
2d 165, 166 (Fla. 1980).
153. 387 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
154. Id. at 1048.
155. 387 So. 2d at 1049.
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motion."15 e
IV. THE INITIAL PHASES OF AN ACTION
A. Pleadings
Two cases addressed the problem of when a litigant must
plead with specificity. In San Marco Contracting Co. v. Depart-
ment of Transportation,157 the trial court dismissed the construc-
tion company's amended complaint because it failed to allege spe-
cifically that the company had filed its claim in accordance with a
departmental regulation that the parties had inserted in the con-
tract. The contractual term required the construction company to
file a claim with the Department of Transportation first. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, First District, reversed, distinguishing condi-
tions precedent contained in a contract from statutory prerequi-
sites to bringing suit. The court noted that when a statute creates
a cause of action, a pleader must specifically allege compliance
with the statutory prerequisites. Noting that the department's
specifications were neither a statutory nor an administrative rem-
edy, the court concluded that the filing requirement was a contrac-
tual condition precedent, which under rule 1.020(c) of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure,'158 did not require a specific allegation of
compliance.159
Another case, Florida Power Corp. v. Zenith Industries Co.,160
dealt with the relationship between the judicially created rule that
parties are to generally plead general damages and rule 1.020(g) of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires the specific
pleading of special damages. In Florida Power, Zenith sought a re-
fund of allegedly excessive fuel charges. The complaint also alleged
unspecified general and special damages. The court defined general
damages as "the direct, natural, logical and necessary conse-
quences" of an injury.' 6' Because any overcharges were properly
recoverable only as general damages through the Public Service
Commission, not the courts, only special damages were at issue.
156. Id.
157. 386 So. 2d 615.
158. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.020(c).
159. 386 So. 2d at 617. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.020(c) provides, "In pleading the performance
or occurrence of conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions
precedent have been performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or occurrence
shall be made specifically and with particularity."
160. 377 So. 2d 203.
161. Id. at 205 (citing Jacksonville Elec. Co. v. Batchis, 54 Fla. 192, 44 So. 933 (1907)).
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Since Zenith did not plead special damages with particularity, the
complaint was deficient." 2
In addition to inquiring into whether a complaint should con-
tain specific allegations, a litigant commencing an action must also
be concerned with the effect of. the exhibits attached to his plead-
ings. Under rule 1.130(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
attached exhibits become part of the pleading for all purposes. 113
Thus, if inartful drafting raises questions about the sufficiency of a
pleading, the court may examine attached exhibits to ascertain
whether the pleadings and exhibits, taken as a whole, state a cause
of action.16 4 A problem arises when an inconsistency exists between
the general allegations of material fact in a complaint and the spe-
cific facts revealed in an exhibit.
In Schweitzer v. Seaman,165 two podiatrists entered into an
agreement permitting the defendant, described in the contract as
an independent contractor, to use the plaintiff's equipment in ex-
change for a percentage of his gross revenue. The defendant also
agreed that, if the arrangement terminated, he would not practice
podiatry within five miles of their office for a three-year period.
The defendant subsequently violated the covenant not to compete.
The plaintiff's amended complaint alleged that the agreement cre-
ated a partnership. Noting the conflict between the allegation in
the complaint and the terms of the agreement, which the plaintiff
had attached as an exhibit to the pleadings, the Fourth District
held, "Where there is an inconsistency between the general allega-
tions of material fact in the complaint and the specific facts re-
vealed by the exhibit, and they have the effect of neutralizing each
other, the pleading is rendered objectionable." 166 The court af-
firmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint.
B. Counterclaims, Cross-Claims, and Third-Party Practice
Recent developments treat cross-claims and counterclaims al-
most identically. Newly amended rule 1.170(f) provides: "When a
pleader fails to set up a counterclaim or cross-claim through over-
sight, inadvertence or excusable neglect or when justice requires,
162. Id. (dictum).
163. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.130(b).
164. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. L.F.E. Corp., 382 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (complaint
allowed to stand when exhibits revealed that defendant was a "volunteer" and therefore
subject to liability for his negligence).
165. 383 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
166. Id. at 1178.
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the pleader may set up the counterclaim or cross-claim by amend-
ment with leave of the court."' 67 Previously, the rule applied only
to omitted counterclaims.
In Hilton Casinos, Inc. v. First National Bank,65 the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, considered whether a third-party
defendant's cross-claim against the plaintiff satisfied rule 1.180169
by applying the analysis federal courts use in determining the suf-
ficiency of a compulsory counterclaim under rule 13(a) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. First, the court noted that just as
rule 1.180 requires a third party's cross-claim to be connected to
the subject matter of the original complaint, rule 1.170(a) 70 re-
quires a compulsory counterclaim to arise "out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim.''7 Then, observing that the wording of the Florida and fed-
eral counterclaim rules was identical, the court turned to a federal
district court case for the following four-step analysis:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and
counterclaim largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's
claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff's claim as well as defendant's counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim? 171
Applying this test to the facts before it, the court found the third-
party defendant's claim unrelated to the subject matter of the
complaint. Accordingly, the Third District reversed the trial
court's order denying the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the third
party's cross-claim.
C. Amending the Pleadings
Florida has a liberal policy regarding the amendment of plead-
ings "in order that causes may be tried on their merits and justice
may be achieved.' 1 73 Courts should resolve all doubts in favor of
167. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(f) (emphasis added).
168. 380 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
169. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.180.
170. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(a).
171. 380 So. 2d at 1062.
172. Id. at 1063 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 342 F. Supp. 715, 717 (D. Kan.
1972)).
173. Singh v. Toiz, 380 So. 2d 1326, 1329 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (quoting Enstrom v.
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allowing amendments, except when parties abuse the privilege.1 7'
For example, an attorney who consciously disregards a court's or-
der to file an amended pleading abuses the privilege. This situation
occurred in Singh v. Tolz, 175 in which the trial court dismissed the
original complaint and ordered the plaintiff's attorney to file
amended pleadings within twenty days. The attorney, a newly
hired associate, failed to do so. Instead, he attempted to comply
with the order after the defendant had moved for a dismissal and
entry of final judginent. Even then, the associate merely refiled the
original complaint. The trial court granted the defendant's motion
to dismiss. On appeal, the plaintiff's new attorney argued that the
failure to file an amended pleading was excusable neglect because
the associate's supervising attorney was ill and unavailable during
the crucial phase of the litigation. Nevertheless, the District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, affirmed the dismissal, concluding that
the plaintiff's original attorney consciously disregarded the order
of the trial court when he failed to file an amended complaint. 76
When a party requests permission to amend a pleading, the
trial court must consider the timing of the motion to amend. Two
recent cases indicate that a trial court may properly refuse to allow
the amendment of pleadings late in the trial.1 77 In Pan American
Bank v. Osgood,17 8 the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
noted that a trial court is "in the best position to assess the timeli-
ness and possible disruption and prejudice resulting from the in-
jection of a new issue at that [late] state of the proceedings. '179
Conversely, if a timely filed amended pleading raises a genuine is-
sue of fact, Florida's liberal policy compels a court to accept the
revised pleading.1 80
The Supreme Court of Florida amended rule 1.190(a), which
controls amendments to pleadings, in 1980.181 The previous version
of the rule provided that "if a motion or pleading has been served
Dixon, 354 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)).
174. 380 So. 2d at 1329.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Martinez v. Clark Equip. Co., 382 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (motion to
amend complaint to include new count for breach of implied warranty properly denied when
made nineteen months after trail began); Pan Am. Bank v. Osgood, 383 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1980) (trial court properly denied defendant's motion to amend answer that sought to
introduce new and complex issues at late stage of litigation).
178. 383 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
179. Id. at 1098.
180. Fox v. Perry, 382 So. 2d 1251, 1253 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190.
181. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a) (amended in 391 So. 2d 165, 167 (Fla. 1980)).
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in response to a prior pleading and a party does not plead or move•
in response to the amended pleading, the original response shall be
considered as pleaded to the amended pleading.' 18 2 According to
the Committee Note,183 the court deleted this clause in order to
restore the decision in Scarfone v. Denby,18 4 which had held that a
defendant's response to the plaintiff's original pleadings is not an
answer to the plaintiff's amended complaint.18 5 This deletion par-
allels both federal and earlier Florida practice by requiring a re-
sponse to each amended pleading. 86
Rule 1.190(c) provides that, for statute of limitations purposes,
an amended pleading relates back to the date of the original plead-
ing if "the claim . . . arose out of the conduct, transaction or oc-
currence set forth. . . in the original pleading.' 8 7 The language of
this rule, however, is difficult to reconcile with the rationale that
the District Court of Appeal, Third District, followed in Daniels v.
Weiss.' In Daniels, the original complaint set forth a malpractice
claim against two doctors. The trial court later permitted the
plaintiff's wife to add a derivative claim for loss of consortium. On
appeal, the Third District reversed and held, inter alia, that the
trial court had erred in permitting the amendment."8 9 Under a lib-
eral reading of rule 1.190(c), the Third District should have per-
mitted the amendment because the wife's claim arose out of the
conduct set forth in the original complaint. The court, however,
stated that "[a]n amendment to the pleadings does not relate back
to the date the original complaint was filed if the amendment
states a new cause of action.""e0 Without mentioning the
ordinarily liberal policy underlying the rule, the court held that
182. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a) (1966) (amended 1980).
183. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a), Committee Note (1980).
184. 156 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963).
185. Id. at 697.
186. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a), Committee Note (1980). The Committee Note also points
out that "[tihe adoption of Rule 1.500 requiring notice of an application for default after
filing or serving of any paper eliminates the need for the [last] clause" of subdivision (a). In
addition, the note states that this amendment will aid in simplifying the court file under the
doctrine of Dee v. Southern Brewing Co., 146 Fla. 588, 1 So. 2d 562 (1941), which held that
by filing an amended pleading, the original pleading serves no further purpose in the record.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a), Committee Note (1980).
187. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c).
188. 385 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
189. Id. at 663.
190. Id. (emphasis added). The court extrapolated this principle from Cox v. Seaboard
Coast Line R.R., 360 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), in which the court refused to construe
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c) liberally in considering whether an amendment to the pleadings
related back to the date of the complaint.
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"[a]lthough a claim for loss of consortium is a derivative cause of
action, it nevertheless is a separate action."' 9' Thus, the Third Dis-
trict improperly construed the rule, which only requires that
amendments arise "out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence
set forth" in the original pleading.' 92
V. ACTIONS
A. Extraordinary Writs
In 1980, the Supreme Court of Florida repealed the rules of
civil procedure dealing with writs of certiorari,'98 mandamus,'"
and constitutional stay.' 95 These extraordinary remedies are still
available, but are now governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure.' 96 The court also repealed rule 1.627,' ° which governed
trust accountings.
B. Injunctions
The 1980 revisions extensively amended the rule governing in-
junctions, ' and created a new rule regarding proceedings against
sureties on judicial bonds.' 99 The amendments to rule 1.610, which
governs injunctions, primarily reflect existing case law and conform
the rule to the provisions of rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.' oo
Perhaps the most significant change in rule 1.610 was the crea-
tion of a new subsection authorizing courts to grant temporary re-
straining orders without notice.' Previously, rule 1.610 only pro-
vided for preliminary or permanent injunctions, either of which
could be granted without notice under certain circumstances.'0 '
Now, however, injunctions may not issue "without notice to the
191. 385 So. 2d at 663.
192. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c).
193. In re Rules of Civil Procedure, 391 So. 2d 165, 177 (Fla. 1980) (repealing Fla. R.
Civ. P. 1.640, 3 FLA. STAT. 107 (1969)).
194. Id. (repealing Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.660, 3 FLA. STAT. 107 (1969)).
195. Id. (repealing Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.680, 3 FLA. STAT. 108 (1969)).
196. FLA. R. App. P. 9.010, .030(c), .100.
197. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.637, 253 So. 2d 404, 411-12 (Fla. 1971) repealed by In re Rules of
Civil Procedure, 391 So. 2d 165, 177 (Fla. 1980).
198. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610.
199. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.625.
200. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610, Committee Note.
201. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(b).
202. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(a)-(b) (1969) (amended 1980).
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adverse party. ' 20 8
To obtain a restraining order, the movant must show by affi-
davit or verified pleading that he will suffer immediate and irrepa-
rable injury if required to give notice to the adverse party. °4 In
addition, the movant's attorney must file a certificate detailing any
efforts that the movant has made to notify the opposing party and
the reasons why notice should not be required. °5 The trial court
may not consider matters outside of the affidavit or verified plead-
ing unless the opposing party appears at the hearing. If the court
grants the order ex parte, the order must "define the injury, state
why it may be irreparable, give the reasons why the order was
granted without notice," and indicate the date and hour of en-
try.20 6 The order will automatically expire ten days after entry un-
less extended for an additional ten days upon a showing of good
cause or the consent of the opposing party.20 7
Parties generally file motions for a temporary restraining order
and a preliminary injunction simultaneously. If a court issues a
temporary restraining order without notice, the court must hear
the motion for preliminary injunction "at the earliest possible time
and [the motion] shall take precedence over all matters except
older matters of the same character."' 8 The opposing party may
move for a modification or dissolution of the restraining order
upon giving three days' notice to the party who obtained the order.
The court must entertain this motion as soon as practicable.' 0 9 As
amended, rule 1.610 still requires parties obtaining a temporary re-
straining order or preliminary injunction to post a bond, but now
grants trial courts the discretion to consider the public interest and
dispense with the requirement if an injunction is issued in favor of
a governmental entity. 10
As amended, rule 1.610 reflects the emphasis of existing Flor-
ida case law on the extraordinary nature of injunctive relief. In-
junctions should be granted sparingly, cautiously, and only when
the supporting reasons are stated with particularity in writing.
In Tri-Plaza Corp. v. Field,'11 for example, the District Court
203. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(a).
204. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(b)(1)(A).
205. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.610(b)(1)(B)-(C).
206. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(b)(2).
207. FLA. R. COv. P. 1.610(b)(2).
208. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(b)(3).
209. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(b)(4).
210. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(c).
211. 382 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (per curiam).
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of Appeal, Fourth District, considered the prerequisites to the issu-
ance of an injunction. Reversing the trial court's grant of a tempo-
rary injunction, the Fourth District emphasized that the moving
party must demonstrate irreparable harm, the absence of a legal
remedy, and the insufficiency of money damages. The court also
stressed the importance of a bond, declaring that it is "impermissi-
ble to grant a temporary mandatory injunction without requiring
bond in the absence of evidence showing financial inability to ob-
tain bond. '212 Conceding that the decision to grant or deny a tem-
porary injunction is within the trial court's discretion, the court
observed that this discretion must be tempered by an analysis of
the above prerequisites. "The issuance of a temporary injunction is
an extraordinary and drastic remedy which should be granted
sparingly and with caution, only after the moving party has proven
sufficient facts entitling it to relief. '2 13
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has added an ad-
ditional prerequisite to the grant of an injunction. In Fredericks v.
Blake,2" a taxpayer sought to enjoin state approval of preliminary
tax assessments in Dade County. After he filed the complaint but
before a hearing was held on the matter, the state approved the
tax rolls, thus rendering the need for injunctive relief moot. Al-
though the Third District affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
complaint on mootness grounds, the court remarked that an in-
junction should not issue when "confusion and disorder" resulting
in possible public injury outweighs an individual's right to seek re-
lief. 15 The court further explained that an injunction would have
deprived local taxing authorities of the timely and orderly receipt
of revenues and would have prevented the executive director of the
State Department of Revenue from executing his statutorily de-
fined duties.21 '6 These detriments outweighed any harm suffered by
the movant and would justify denying injunctive relief.
As previously noted, rule 1.610 makes the posting of a bond a
prerequisite of injunctive relief.117 In 1980, the Supreme Court of
Florida adopted rule 1.625 to permit parties to assert claims
against sureties on judicial bonds by motion. 18 Although the rule
212. Id. at 331.
213. Id.
214. 382 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
215. Id. at 371.
216. Id.
217. See note 210 and accompanying text supra.
218. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.625.
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provides an alternative to independent actions against sureties, ob-
ligees may still file an independent action21 9 The new rule requires
sureties to provide a service address when posting bond and thus
submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. If a party seeks
to enforce a surety's liability by motion, he may serve the motion
by mailing it to the address provided by the surety. The rule also
provides for default and preserves the right to a jury trial.2 2
C. Declaratory Judgments
Several appellate court cases have critically examined the
character and proper scope of actions for declaratory relief. Among
the issues considered were the nature of the declaratory remedy," 1
the right to trial by jury in declaratory actions,222 and the legal
effect of a dismissal of a complaint for declaratory relief.2 2
In Cherry v. Bronson,224 a tenured college professor who had
received a notice of dismissal sought an administrative hearing in
accordance with the provisions of the faculty handbook. He also
sought to disqualify the college president from acting as a hearing
examiner, alleging bias. When the president refused to recuse him-
self, the professor filed an action for damages and equitable relief,
and for a declaration of his rights under the handbook provisions.
The trial court dismissed the claim, citing the professor's failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies.
The District Court of Appeal, Fifth District, reversed, observ-
ing that "[d]eclaratory judgments are appropriate to afford parties
relief from insecurity and uncertainty with regards to rights or le-
gal relationships. ' '225 The court adopted the following standard of
review:
The test recognized in this state of whether or not a complaint
will give rise to a proceeding under the Declaratory Judgment
Act inquires whether or not the party seeking a declaration
shows that he is in doubt or is uncertain as to the existence or
non-existence of some right, status, immunity, power or privi-
lege and has an actual, practical and present need for a
declaration.22 6
219. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.625, Committee Note.
220. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.625.
221. Cherry v. Bronson, 384 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
222. Cooley v. Cody, 377 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
223. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Anta, 379 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
224. 384 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
225. Id. at 170 (citing Jones v. Howland, 369 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)).
226. Id. (quoting Hialeah Race Course v. Gulfstream Racing Ass'n, 210 So. 2d 750, 752
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The court recognized that one must ordinarily exhaust all ad-
ministrative remedies before commencing a court action, but
added that this policy applies only when adequate administrative
remedies are available.1 7 The court then found that the adminis-
trative remedies authorized by the faculty handbook did not assure
a fair hearing by impartial judges, and ruled that a declaratory ac-
tion was the proper vehicle for determining the petitioner's rights.
The court did, however, affirm the trial court's dismissal of the
portions of the complaint that sought damages and specific per-
formance because those issues were premature.2
In Cooley v. Cody, 2 9 the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, considered whether the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial in
an action for declaratory relief. The plaintiff had challenged cer-
tain deeds, alleging that they were ineffective because the grantor
was incompetent, and unduly and fraudulently influenced by the
defendants to execute the. deeds. The complaint demanded a jury
trial on all triable issues.280 Before trial, the defendants moved for
an adjudication of the plaintiff's right to a jury trial, claiming that
the suit was an equitable action to rescind a deed and, therefore,
carried no right to trial by jury. Nonetheless, the court submitted
the question of the deed's validity to the jury.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, reversed and re-
manded, stating that the trial court had the discretion to submit
appropriate factual issues to the jury, but this discretion did not
extend to issues of fact traditionally within the province of eq-
uity.28 1 The court found that the claim "premised on the rescission
of deeds on the grounds of incompetency and undue influence was
clearly grounded in equity.'' 282 The trial court had thus committed
reversible error by submitting the entire matter to the jury for a
general verdict.2
In Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Anta,"' the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Third District, considered whether a trial
court's dismissal of a complaint for declaratory relief represented a
ruling on the merits. Following an automobile accident, Mr. and
(Fla. 4th DCA 1968)).
227. 384 So. 2d at 170.
228. Id.
229. 377 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
230. Id. at 797.
231. Id. (citing Berg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 88 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1956)).
232. 377 So. 2d at 797.
233. Id. at 798.
234. 379 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (per curiam).
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Mrs. Anta had settled with the other party's insurance carrier by
executing a general release in return for $10,000. The Antas then
filed a claim against their own carrier, Government Employees In-
surance Co. ("GEICO"), for underinsured motorist's coverage. GE-
ICO denied coverage, claiming that the release executed by the
Antas had also released GEICO from liability. The parties to the
release subsequently agreed to declare it null and void on the
ground of mutual mistake because of the effect the release had on
the Antas' underinsured motorist claim. The Antas also returned
the $10,000 they had received. GEICO then filed a complaint seek-
ing a declaratory judgment as to the legal effect of the release and
the subsequent agreement to set the release aside. The trial court
dismissed the complaint without explanation. On appeal, the Third
District reversed. In response to the Antas' contention that the dis-
misal represented the trial court's ruling on the merits of GEICO's
claim, the Third District stated:
Unlike other actions, a motion to dismiss a petition for declara-
tory judgment does not go to the merits but goes only to the
question of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to a declara-
tion of rights-not to whether or not he is entitled to a declara-
tion in his favor .... In spite of the fact that appellant, in his
motion to dismiss, raised an issue on the merits, a ruling by the
trial court on the merits at that time was premature. A ruling on
the merits should not be made until after final hearing where
the parties have full opportunity to present evidence in support
of their respective positions.2 35
The court found that in ruling on a motion to dismiss a declar-
atory judgment action, a trial court may determine only whether
the movant has stated a proper claim for relief. The court then
concluded that the question of the validity of the release and the
effect of the subsequent agreement were proper subjects for a de-
claratory action, because a determination of those issues would af-
fect the insurer's legal rights and relations, and thus its liability.28
6
It was therefore improper for the trial court to consider the merits
of the claim on a pretrial motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim for declaratory relief.
235. Id. at 1039 (quoting Mills v. Ball, 344 So. 2d 635, 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (cita-
tions omitted)).
236. 379 So. 2d at 1040.
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VI. PARTIES
A. In General
Rule 1.210 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure2 37 specifies
what parties may sue, both generally and in representative capaci-
ties. Prior to the 1980 amendments, the rule had four subdivisions:
(a) parties generally, (b) infants or incompetents, (c) trustees as
representatives of beneficiaries, and (d) parties in actions to exe-
cute trusts of a will.23" The Supreme Court of Florida repealed the
latter two subdivisions in 1980 after statutory changes made them
obsolete.3 9
B. Joinder
Subsection (a) of rule 1.210, which describes the various par-
ties that may be joined in an action, provides in part that "[a]ll
persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in ob-
taining the relief demanded may join as plaintiffs and any person
may be made a defendant who has or claims an interest adverse to
the plaintiff. '240 Clemons v. Flagler Hospital, Inc. 41 raised the in-
teresting question whether one can join a defendant's insurance
company as an adverse party when the statute of limitations has
run with respect to the insured. In Clemons, the plaintiff had filed
a malpractice suit against a hospital within the limitations period.
Five years later he filed a second amended complaint, which joined
the hospital's liability insurance carriers as defendants. The trial
court dismissed the claims against the insurance carriers on the
ground that the statute of limitations had expired. The District
Court of Appeal, Fifth District, reversed, holding that the insur-
ance carriers could be joined at any stage of the proceedings.2 4 '
237. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210.
238. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210(c)-(d), 3 FLA. STAT. 85.86 (1969).
239. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 391 So. 2d 165, 167 (Fla. 1980); see FLA.
STAT. § 737.402(2)(z) (1981), which empowers trustees to prosecute and defend actions re-
gardless of the conditions established in FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210. FLA. STAT. § 733.212 (1981)
provides a means of eliminating the interest of an heir at law whq is not a beneficiary under
the will, obviating the need for former Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210(d), 3 FLA. STAT. 86 (1969). The
Committee Note to the 1980 amendment also points out that "[t]o the extent that an heir at
law is an indispensable party to a legal proceeding concerning a testamentary trust, due
process requires notice and an opportunity to defend, so the rule would be unconstitution-
ally applied." FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210, Committee Note.
240. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a).
241. 385 So. 2d 1134, 1136 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
242. Id. Florida common law permits the joinder of an insurance carrier in an action
against its insured on the theory that the insurer is the "real party in interest" within the
1981]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Moreover, a plaintiff's right under rule 1.210(a) to sue an insurance
carrier directly does not change the established rule that a cause of
action against the carrier does not arise until the entry of judg-
ment against the insured. Since the statute of limitations had not
yet begun to run against the defendant carriers,'" their joinder
could not be barred. The court noted that this doctrine did not
"create or affect any substantive rights or privileges,' ' 4 because
joinder is a procedural, not substantive right.
C. Indispensable Parties
Fulmer v. Northern Central Bank'" illustrates the interaction
of rule 1.210(a)" 6 and the indispensable party doctrine. In Fulmer,
the personal representative of an estate sought to void the dece-
dent's inter vivos transfers of assets to a trust. The trial court dis-
missed the action because it had no jurisdiction over the trust, its
assets, or its beneficiaries, all of which were located in another
state. On appeal the District Court of Appeal, Second District, af-
firmed in part, but not on jurisdictional grounds. Rather, because
the beneficiaries were indispensable parties under Florida law,
and because, as nonresidents, the court could not subject them to
its jurisdiction, the suit was subject to dismissal under rule
1.140(b) for the failure to join indispensable parties ." 8 The trial
court erred in dismissing the claim with prejudice,"'4 however, be-
cause the failure to join an indispensable partyis not an adjudica-
tion on the merits under rule 1.420(b).250
VII. CLASS ACTIONS
The Supreme Court of Florida's comprehensive revision of
rule 1.220 in 1980 considerably broadened the scope and availabil-
ity of class actions.2' Although the new rule resembles rule 23 of
meaning of FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a). Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969); see
Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970).
243. 385 So. 2d at 1135.
244. Id. at 1136 (citing Markert v. Johnston, 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978)).
245. 386 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
246. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a).
247. 386 So. 2d at 858 (citing Byers v. Beddow, 106 Fla. 166, 142 So. 894 (1932)).
248. 386 So. 2d at 858.
249. Id. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b) provides that any dismissal not provided for under the
rule, "other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an
indispensable party, operates as an adjudication on the merits."
250. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b).
251. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220 (amended in 391 So. 2d 165, 168-69 (Fla. 1980)).
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,252 it differs from the federal
rule in several respects. For example, subsections (a) and (b) of
rule 1.220253 clarify both the prerequisites to class representation
and the claims and defenses a class can maintain. In addition, sub-
section (c), which the supreme court borrowed in large part from
the local rules of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida,254 provides detailed pleading requirements
designed to facilitate the administration of class actions.255 Finally,
subsection (d) prescribes stricter and more detailed notice require-
ments than those set out in the federal rule.2"6 Rule 1.220 parallels
the federal provisions that establish a schedule for determining is-
sues, allow class members to "opt out," authorize subclasses, and
set forth notice and hearing requirements for court-approved dis-
missals or compromises of class claims.25
In 1980 the supreme court also renumbered the rule governing
class actions brought by condominium associations, and expressly
exempted the associations from the requirements of rule 1.220.258
The court had adopted the condominium class action rule in 1977
in Avila South Condominium Association, Inc. v. Kappa Corp.
In that case, the court invalidated a statute2 0 that permitted con-
dominium associations to sue on behalf of unit owners in matters
of common interest. By attempting to define the proper parties to
a lawsuit, the legislature had impermissibly invaded "the exclusive
252. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
253. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)-(b).
254. S.D. FLA. R. 19.
255. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(c) requires: (1) the designation "Class Representation" in the
caption of the pleaiings, (2) specific references to the provisions of subsection (b) relied
upon by the class, (3) an explanation of the common questions of law and fact, (4) the
pleading of particular facts giving rise to the class claim, (5) the approximate number in the
class, (6) a definition of the class, and (7) the facts and circumstances giving rise to the
application of a subsection (b) provision.
256. Compare FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(d) with FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
In 1979, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, held that procedural due process
does not require a class representative to notify all class members of stipulations entered
into for settlement purposes. Scott v. Walker, 378 So. 2d 828, 829 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Al-
though notice may not be constitutionally mandated, the notice requirements of FLA. R. Civ.
P. 1.220(d)(2) have somewhat emasculated this holding. The Supreme Court of Florida re-
jected proposed FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.222, authorizing shareholder derivative actions similar to
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1, on the ground that the proposed rule would be "incompatible with
substantive and decisional law regarding the nature of derivative actions." In re Rules of
Civil Procedure, 391 So. 2d 165, 165 (Fla. 1980).
257. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(d)-(e).
258. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.221.
259. 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1976).
260. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(2) (1977).
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prerogative" of the supreme court to adopt rules of procedure.2"
Nonetheless, to avoid a potential constitutional problem and pro-
vide condominium owners with a dispute-settlement mechanism,
the court adopted the text of the invalidated statute as a rule of
procedure.2 62
The following year, the Civil Procedure Rules Committee un-
successfully urged the supreme court to modify the rule adopted in
Avila,2" arguing that the rule was unnecessary under the existing
rules and statutory framework. 264 The committee had also argued
that the new rule would "force litigation upon unwilling members
of a class which is contrary to the precepts of a traditional class
action. '265 The supreme court rejected this analysis also, noting
that in a number of instances since the adoption of the rule, trial
judges had required class representatives to notify putative class
members, thus permitting the class members to "opt out.' ' 266 Al-
though this practice is not inconsistent with either the old or the
new rules,2 " the absence of an express opting out provision may be
significant because of a defendant's ability to counterclaim against
the class. A class member might inadvertently waive the right to
opt out without realizing that he was a party.
Despite controversy and dissatisfaction, the rule announced in
Avila survived the 1980 amendment in essentially its original
form.268 The condominium class action rule, however, has been
used infrequently, and only one district court of appeal decision
dealt with the rule in 1980. In Kohl v. Bay Colony Club Condo-
miniuM,2 9 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, ruled
that in class actions, a court has jurisdiction over the putative class
members for all purposes, including the entertainment of counter-
261. 347 So. 2d at 608.
262. Id.
263. In re Rule 1.220(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 353 So. 2d 95, 95 (Fla. 1977).
264. The committee had argued that the statute merely created a substantive "capac-
ity" to sue in the condominium association, a right properly created by the legislature, and
that FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b) was superfluous. The committee further argued that FLA. R.
Civ. P. 1.220(a) would determine an association's standing to maintain an action. 353 So. 2d
at 96. The court conceded that the legislature had the power to grant a substantive right,
but emphasized that the court was solely responsible for the procedural vehicle by which the
right could be asserted.
265. 353 So. 2d at 97.
266. Id.
267. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b), 347 So. 2d 599, 608 (Fla. 1977); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.221.
268. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.221.
269. 385 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
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claims, until the members request exclusion from the class.27 0
VIII. DISCOVERY
A. Scope
The language of rule 1.280(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure2 71 provides that "[p]arties may obtain discovery regard-
ing any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject mat-
ter of the pending action. . . [or] appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 2 72 The requirements
of relevancy and reasonableness, however, allow the judiciary con-
siderable discretion in setting the bounds of the discovery process.
For example, in Equifax v. Cooper,273 the District Court of
Appeal, Fifth District, vacated a trial court's order to produce doc-
uments that was supported by nothing more than speculation of
counsel. 7  The court observed that the discovery request did not
satisfy the requisites of relevance and reasonableness. The plain-
tiff in Equifax had sought discovery of three surveillance films and
a report that had been prepared by an agency investigating the
plaintiff. Although the plaintiff was the subject of the investiga-
tions, the investigations were not connected with the litigation.
The court reasoned that, even though the report pertained to the
plaintiff, this was not a sufficient connection, standing alone, to
warrant intrusion of the issue into the case, and that "[a]ny other
rule would transform every lawsuit into a fishing expedition, . . .
seriously imped[ing] the orderly and expeditious disposition of
litigation. 2 76
The work-product privilege contained within rule 1.280(b)(2)
also constrains the scope of the discovery process. The provision of
the rules allowing a party to discover material prepared for trial
tempers the privilege when the party needs the materials to pre-
pare his case and cannot otherwise obtain equivalent material
without undue hardship.27 7 In Equifax, a third party had initiated
the investigation for a different lawsuit. The court refused to ven-
ture beyond the literal language of the rule and extend the scope of
270. Id. at 1029.
271. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b).
272. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1).
273. 380 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
274. Id. at 515.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 516.
277. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(2).
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discovery in contravention of the work-product privilege to situa-
tions in which the parties have an interest in other, but related,
litigation.2 78 To come within the ambit of the work-product privi-
lege, a party must show that the materials reflect "some indication
of personal thought, views, knowledge, or evaluation by the attor-
ney, litigant, or agent. ' 279 Thus, the privilege would not extend to
a third party's documents or papers in the custody of an attorney,
party, or agent until trial.
In Colonial Penn Insurance Co. v. Blair180 a plaintiff who
claimed the work-product privilege objected to the defendant's re-
quest for the transcript of a traffic court proceeding concerning the
accident involved in the litigation. The plaintiff's attorney had a
court reporter attend the traffic hearing and record selected testi-
mony, including that of one of the defendants. In holding the tran-
script discoverable as trial preparation material, the court reasoned
that the plaintiff had the only transcript of the traffic court pro-
ceeding. Moreover, the defendants could not obtain the transcript
in another manner. 81 Observing that memory is a poor substitute
for documented statements made soon after the accident, the court
also emphasized the defendants' need for the transcript to prepare
their defense. 82
One particularly troublesome area in which the courts have
difficulty in defining the bounds of reasonable inquiry is the dis-
covery of a defendant's financial worth when a plaintiff is seeking
punitive damages. The Supreme Court of Florida finally addressed
this issue when it settled a conflict between the First and Second
District Courts of Appeal in Tennant v. Charlton.2 81 The Second
District in Tennant had concluded there was no reason to place
the financial worth of the party in a special discovery category. All
documents indicating financial resources, including tax returns and
business statements, were subject to discovery when punitive dam-
278. 380 So. 2d at 515. The plaintiff sought discovery of surveillance films made by an
investigatory agency that a third party had retained. The defendants apparently wanted to
bring these materials within the scope of FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(2) although the films were
available from another source. The court, however, refused to extend the rule and held that
the requirements of FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1) must be satisfied before the work-product
rule becomes operative. Id.; cf. Howard Johnson's Motor Lodges, Inc. v. Baranov, 379 So. 2d
114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (the existence, but not necessarily the contents, of surveillance
films and information discoverable).
279. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Blair, 380 So. 2d 1305, 1306 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
280. 380 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
281. Id. at 1306.
282. Id.
283. 377 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1979), af'g 365 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
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ages were properly sought. If necessary, the trial judge could limit
the discovery process under rule 1.280 to protect a party if the re-
quest is annoying, embarrassing, oppressive, or unduly burden-
some.2 8 Conversely, the First District took the position that dis-
covery of tax returns and profit and loss statements should be
denied.2 85 Asserting that these documents do not accurately reflect
a party's true financial worth, the court concluded that a properly
authenticated financial statement is more accurate.'8
In accordance with the Second District's position, the supreme
court held that the discovery of a party's financial resources in pu-
nitive damage cases should not be limited to a sworn statement of
current assets and liabilities. 8 7 In support of its holding, the court
observed that:
[O]ne party frequently minimizes his financial ability to respond
when it is an issue in a law suit, while the other party often has
a tendency to inflate that same financial ability. Even under
oath a party often seems to view another party's financial re-
sources as great or small in direct proportion to the benefit
which will accrue to that party. Thus, it is the height of naivet6
to suggest that a sworn statement of one's net worth must be
accepted as the final word on that important subject. The search
for forgotten or hidden assets is of the essence of the discovery
process. 88
The supreme court also agreed with the Second District that the
trial courts should protect a party from harassment and overly
burdensome inquiry and limit the discovery of financial resources
by issuing a protective order under rule 1.280(c)."' In support of
its holding, the court stated that
[tihe trial court should keep in mind that in most punitive dam-
ages cases, at the time plaintiffs are seeking discovery of defen-
dants' financial resources, there has not yet been a judicial de-
termination of the defendants' liability. If plaintiffs were
allowed unlimited discovery of defendants' financial resources in
cases where there is no actual factual basis for an award of puni-
tive damages, the personal and private financial affairs of defen-
dants would be unnecessarily exposed and, in some cases, the
284. Chariton v. Tennant, 365 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
285. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc. v. Pogue, 280 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973).
286. Id.
287. 377 So. 2d at 1170.
288. Id. (quoting Donahue v. Herbert, 355 So. 2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)).
289. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c).
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threat of such exposure might be used by unscrupulous plaintiffs
to coerce settlements from innocent defendants. In determining
whether defendants' motion for protective order under rule
1.280(c) is "for good cause shown," the trial court may consider,
among other things, whether or not an actual factual basis exists
for an award of punitive damages.209
Evidently, mere allegations of a cause of action entitling a party to
demand punitive damages will no longer suffice to justify the dis-
covery of a party's financial resources.
The determination whether a court should limit discovery by
issuing a protective order is a question of fact that must be consid-
ered on a case-by-case basis. In Union Fidelity Life Insurance Co.
v. Seay,291 the plaintiff requested the insurance company to pro-
duce all records concerning the denial of a certain type of claim,
with no limitation regarding the time period or number of claims.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, held that the trial
court abused its discretion when it denied petitioner's motion for a
protective order, and quashed the trial court's order. The court
also observed that the proper procedure in these situations is for
the party opposing discovery to select an appropriate representa-
tive to be deposed in Florida pursuant to rule 1.310(b)(6). 2" If nec-
essary or appropriate, the party can then secure the discovery of
the records at a reasonable time and place."' 3
Another consideration relevant to the reasonableness of a pro-
duction request is whether the nature of the documents or their
proposed use is predicated on an existing cause of action. If a cause
of action does not clearly exist, a litigant may only discover materi-
als that are likely to resolve the question. For example, in Sun-
shine Sound Enterprises v. Williams, 9 4 the District Court of Ap-
peal, Third District, reversed the trial court's order directing the
defendant to produce all of the documents the plaintiff would need
to conduct an accounting of the matters that formed the subject of
her complaint. Noting that the trial court had failed to determine
290. 377 So. 2d at 1170.
291. 378 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Compliance with the request would have
required the production of 45,000 policies that were stored on computer software in Penn-
sylvania. Id. at 1269.
292. The rule provides that when a party names a corporation as a deponent and iden-
tifies, with reasonable particularity, the matters to be examined, the corporation shall desig-
nate a representative to testify about matters known or reasonably available to the corpora-
tion. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b)(6).
293. 378 So. 2d at 1269.
294. 382 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
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whether any right to an accounting existed, the court held that it
was-premature to order the production of documents pertaining to
the accounting itself.2 a9
One example of the public policy limitations on the scope of
discovery occurs in the context of medical mediation proceedings
and malpractice actions. Section 768.40(4) of the Florida Statutes
shields from civil discovery requests the records of a medical re-
view committee296 that has the authority to examine negligence
claims against providers of health services.2 97 The statute also pro-
hibits persons who attend a committee hearing from subsequently
testifying about the proceedings. This statutory immunity does
not, however, extend to information that is available from other
sources, nor does it extend to persons who have knowledge inde-
pendent of the committee hearings.2 98 Nevertheless, public policy
may sometimes prohibit discovery of this kind of information even
if the statutory privilege does not apply.
For example, in Segal v. Roberts,2 ee the plaintiff in a medical
malpractice action sought discovery of the entire file of an ad hoc
hospital committee that had previously evaluated the conduct,
skill, and ability of the defendant-doctor in matters unrelated to
the plaintiff's action. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth Dis-
trict, found section 768.40(4) inapplicable because the statute only
prohibits discovery if the cause of action asserted in the complaint
arose out of a matter that the committee has evaluated. 00 None-
theless, the court refused to allow discovery as a matter of public
policy, stating that "[t]he arguments in favor of confidentiality of
the records and proceedings of a medical review committee are so
compelling that discovery should be allowed only in the most ne-
cessitous circumstances. '" ' Thus, when the statute is not applica-
295. Id. at 431.
296. FLA. STAT. § 768.40(1) (1981) defines a medical review committee as:
a committee of a state or local professional society of health care providers or of
a medical staff of a licensed hospital or nursing home, provided the medical staff
operates pursuant to written bylaws that have been approved by the governing
board of the hospital or nursing home, which committee is formed to evaluate
and improve the quality of health care rendered by providers of health service
297. Included in the definition of health care providers are licensed physicians, podia-
trists, osteopaths, dentists, chiropractors, and pharmacists. Id.
298. FLA. STAT. § 768.40(4) (1981).
299. 380 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
300. Id. at 1052.
301. Id. Judge Schwartz in Dade County Medical Ass'n v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117, 120
(Fla. 3d DCA 1979), indicated that these arguments are based on an overwhelming public
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ble, a party may obtain discovery of medical review committee files
only upon a "showing of 'exceptional necessity' or 'extraordinary
circumstances.' "302
B. Depositions and Other Devices
In 1980 the Supreme Court of Florida revised the procedures
governing depositions and other discovery devices to bring them in
line with current needs and actual practices. These revisions are
indicative of the judiciary's concern that litigation has become in-
creasingly complex and expensive.
Subsection (d) of rule 1.290,30- which dealt with depositions de
bene esse, was repealed because the existing rules have made these
depositions obsolete.30 4 The supreme court also revised rule 1.400
to grant the public the right to examine depositions.30 5 As
amended, the rule states: "Unless otherwise ordered by the court,
(1) any deposition may be opened and examined by any person
interest in keeping hospital staff meetings confidential. Confidentiality fosters the flow of
ideas and advice. Fear of disclosure, in the event of a malpractice suit, hinders the objec-
tives of these meetings.
302. Dade County Medical Ass'n v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117, 121 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (quot-
ing Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250-51 (D.D.C. 1970)).
303. The supreme court repealed Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.290(d), effective January 1, 1981. See
391 So. 2d 165, 170 (Fla. 1980). This provision allowed a person to take the deposition of
himself or another person, regarding a matter cognizable in any court of the state, if loss of
that person's testimony was threatened because of advanced age, illness, or if the person was
about to leave the state. Under these circumstances a person would not have to comply with
the petition and notice requirements of FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.290(a). See FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.290
(prior to 1980 amendment).
304. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.290, Committee Note; see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280, .310. One of the
changes proposed by the Civil Procedure Rules Committee of The Florida Bar called for an
amendment to FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310 to allow for telephone depositions. The proposed
amendment provided in pertinent part:
A party may take a deposition by telephone. If necessary to assure the adequate
right of examination of the deponent, the court may require that the deposition
be taken in the presence of the deponent. The notice shall designate the manner
of recording and preserving the deposition. The court may require that the dep-
osition be taken by stenographic means if necessary to assure that the deposition
will be accurately recorded and properly preserved. A party or the witness may
nevertheless arrange to have a stenographic transcription at his own initial
expense.
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES COMMITTEE, THE FLORIDA BAR, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND REVI-
SIONS TO FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR CYCLE ENDING JULY 1, 1980, at 28-29
(March 19, 1980) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED AMENDMENTS].
Although the court rejected the proposal, it is likely that a change is forthcoming, since
the court referred the matter back to the committee for study and the drafting of an en-
tirely new rule. The court directed the committee to submit its proposal "as soon as practi-
cable" for consideration. In re Rules of Civil Procedure, 391 So. 2d 165, 165 (Fla. 1980).
305. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.400.
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under the supervision of the clerk or (2) the clerk may unseal the
deposition and file it with the other papers in the court file." 8
The purpose of this amendment is to conform the rule with actual
practice.30 7
The supreme court adopted rule 1.351 to permit the produc-
tion of "documents and things" without a deposition.308 This rule
should eliminate the unnecessary expenditure of lawyers' time in
deposing records custodians. The rule prohibits production, how-
ever, if a party objects. The requesting party will have to serve a
notice of deposition and subpoena duces tecum under rule 1.310.309
Judicial decisions interpreting the unamended rules have
made changes in other discovery procedures. For example, Simons
v. Jorg10 involved a paternity action in which the issue was
whether the court could compel the putative father to submit to
the recently developed Human Leukocyte Antigens ("HLA") blood
test81 under rule 1.360(a).8 2 The District Court of Appeal, Second
District, had quashed the trial court's original order granting the
plaintiff's motion to compel the defendant to submit to the blood
test, on the ground that discovery is permissible only on matters
reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. Nothing in
the record indicated that the HLA test results would be admissible
or even lead to admissible evidence."" On remand the plaintiff
again moved to compel the defendant to submit to the blood test
and, at the hearing, introduced the testimony of a pathologist dem-
306. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.400.
307. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.400, Committee Note. Previously the rule only permitted parties
to examine the depositions in the presence of the clerk. Compliance with this requirement
was clearly impractical in counties with large caseloads.
308. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.351 (amended in 391 So. 2d 165, 171-72 (Fla. 1980)).
309. FLA. R. Civ. P., Committee Note; see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310.
310. 384 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
311. The HLA test involves tissue typing of white blood cells and, unlike traditional
blood grouping tests, yields higher probabilities of paternity. For a discussion of the HLA
test, see Terasaki, Resolution by HLA Testing of 1,000 Paternity Cases Not Excluded by
ABO Testing, 16 J. FAM. L. 543 (1978).
312. The rule permits discovery by physical and mental examination:
When the mental or physical condition, including the blood group, of a party or
of a person in the custody or under the legal control of a party is in controversy,
the court in which the action is pending may order the party to submit to a
physical or mental examination by a physician or to produce the person in his
custody or legal control for examination. The order may be made only on motion
for good cause shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and to all
parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions and scope of the
examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.360(a).
313. 375 So. 2d 288, 289 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
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onstrating the accuracy of the HLA test.814 Based on this uncon-
tradicted testimony, the trial court granted the motion despite the
defendant's objection that the test results would not be admissible
as evidence. The Second District affirmed, holding:
Even if this were true, the possible inadmissibility of the test
results would not be sufficient to prevent discovery. Discovery is
permissible with respect to any matter that is relevant to the
subject matter of the pending action, where the information
sought is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence. Relevant evidence is evidence tending to
prove or disprove a material fact ...
... [Plaintiff] adequately established that HLA test results
may have substantial probative value and may be relevant in
this action to establish paternity. The test results, if admitted in
evidence, could have a tendency to prove the fact of paternity,
which is the central issue in controversy in this case. Therefore,
we agree with the trial court that good cause was shown to com-
pel [defendant] to submit to the blood test.3 '6
Although the court held that the plaintiff had shown good
cause to compel the defendant to submit to the HLA test, the
court refused to speculate whether the test results could in fact be
admitted into evidence and, if so, what weight the trier of fact
should give to this medical evidence. 16 Thus, with medical and
technological advances, the discovering party not only has the bur-
den of showing that the information sought is reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,1 but also
must establish the validity or scientific acceptance of the informa-
tion through expert testimony.
Another significant discovery device recently validated by ju-
dicial construction is Florida's version of the Uniform Foreign
314. The testimony of the pathologist was substantially as follows:
The HLA test is not the typical ABO blood grouping test which is in general
use to prove nonpaternity. The HLA testing is a more sophisticated procedure
which involves tissue typing of the whilte blood cells and results in far higher
probabilities of paternity than those yielded by any of the traditional blood
grouping tests. With HLA testing, if a male is not excluded as the father, the
probability of his being the father is usually over 90%. In 16% of the cases, the
probability exceeds 99%. These probability figures can be increased substan-
tially when HLA testing is combined with red cell antigen testing.
384 So. 2d at 1362-63 (footnote omitted).
315. Id. at 1363 (citations omitted).
316. Id.
317. Id.
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Depositions Act ("UFDA"). 1 s The UFDA is designed to facilitate
the depositions of witnesses who are involved in actions in the
United States, but reside in foreign jurisdictions. In 1980 the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fifth District, interpreted the UFDA in
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Hill. 19 In Hill, the defendant filed a
motion pursuant to the UFDA for the appointment of a commis-
sioner to take the deposition of a material witness who resided in
Ohio. Even though opposing counsel did not object or file a motion
for a protective order, the trial court summarily denied the defen-
dant's motion. On appeal, the Fifth District quashed the trial
court's denial of the order as a departure from the essential re-
quirements of the law, and set forth the procedure for taking a
foreign deposition when both the forum and foreign jurisdictions
have enacted the UFDA. 820 A party must first secure the appoint-
ment of a commissioner by a Florida court and then apply to the
foreign court for the necessary process to secure the witness's at-
tendance. 21 The Fifth District strongly suggested that upon re-
quest trial courts should routinely appoint a commissioner, unless
the adverse party provides valid reasons for denying the request. 22
C. Sanctions for Refusal to Comply with Discbvery Orders
During 1980, the Supreme Court of Florida directed the Civil
Procedure Rules Committee to continue evaluating discovery prac-
tice and procedure, including sanctions.2 3 Concurrent with this re-
view, several of the district courts of appeal sought to determine
the circumstances in which trial courts should invoke the harsh
measures of striking pleadings and entering default judgments. At
first glance, the districts are seemingly divided over which situa-
tions reasonably require the application of severe remedies. A care-
318. Whenever any mandate, writ or commission is issued out of any court of
record in any other state, territory, district, or foreign jurisdiction, or whenever
upon notice or agreement it is required to take the testimony of a witness or
witnesses in this state, witnesses may be compelled to appear and testify in the
same manner and by the same process and proceeding as may be employed for
the purpose of taking testimony in proceedings pending in this state.
FLA. STAT. § 92.251(2) (1981).
319. 388 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
320. As of this writing, sixteen jurisdictions have enacted the Uniform Foreign Deposi-
tions Act: Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Panama Canal Zone, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virgin Islands, Virginia,
and Wyoming. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.251 (West Supp. 1982).
321. 388 So. 2d at 650.
322. Id.
323. In re Rules of Civil Procedure, 391 So. 2d 165, 165-66 (Fla. 1980).
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ful reading of the cases, however, reveals that a consistent and uni-
form rule is emerging.
In Ferrante v. Waters,"2 4 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, affirmed a trial court's decision to strike the pleadings of a
nonresident defendant who, despite a court order, had failed to an-
swer interrogatories, and had not responded to two subsequent in-
quiries from her attorney. The court conceded that the sanction
was severe but indicated that striking pleadings was appropriate in
those extreme circumstances which evidence a "'deliberate and
contumacious disregard of the court's authority.' "825 The Fourth
District noted that it was within the trial court's discretion to levy
this sanction and remarked, "Irrespective of whether her failure
came as the result of a deliberate decision to disregard the court's
order, or simply from a negligent abandonment of the lawsuit in
which she had been served and had filed answer,. . such conduct
• . . amply justifies the action of the trial court."8 "
Appearing to display a more lenient position, the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, held in Santuoso v. McGrath &
Associates, Inc.,32 7 that a trial judge had abused his discretion by
entering a default judgment against a defendant who had dis-
obeyed a court order to submit to a second deposition. The court
reasoned that "[elven in a situation where notice is given to the
defendant for the purpose of imposing sanctions, the record must
be clear that such a severe sanction is authorized."32 8 The court
then noted that of all the sanctions available under rule 1.380 of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to make discovery,
the "striking of pleadings, entry of default, and dismissal of an ac-
tion are the most drastic among them and ordinarily will not be
resorted to for the purpose of punishing or penalizing a party."32 9
After examining the facts of the case, the Third District concluded
that they did not justify the entry of a default judgment.
In reaching its conclusion, the Santuoso court relied on some
of the same authority that the Fourth District had used in Fer-
324. 383 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
325. Id. at 751 (quoting Hart v. Weaver, 364 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) and Swin-
dle v. Reid, 242 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)); accord, Herold v. Computer Components
Int'l, Inc., 252 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971) (sanction designed for bad faith and willful
disregard of, or gross indifference to, a court order).
326. 383 So. 2d at 751.
327. 385 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
328. Id. at 113.
329. Id. (citing Leatherby Ins. Co. v. Jones, 332 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) and
Hurley v. Werly, 203 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)).
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rante to justify levying a severe sanction.330 Despite the difference
in results, however, the two cases taken together suggest that harsh
measures are justified when the failure to make discovery amounts
to either willful disregard of the court's authority or gross negli-
gence, or if noncompliance has substantially prejudiced a party.33 1
The Ferrante court, for example, emphasized the defendant's will-
ful disregard of her counsel's efforts to contact her, while the court
in Santuoso pointed to several factors that could explain the de-
fendant's noncompliance with the discovery order. Moreover, the
Santuoso court objected only to the severity of the specific sanc-
tion levied, and expressly stated that a lesser sanction might be
appropriate.3 32
The asserted justification for the party's noncompliance with
discovery orders was also relevant in Storre v. Shults33 In Storre,
the District Court of Appeal, Second District, quashed an order
striking the pleadings of a defendant who had disobeyed an order
compelling discovery while he sought review of the denial of his
motion for a protective order. The Second District concluded that
the assertion of "a legal right cannot constitute grounds to strike
the pleadings of a litigant."" The court intimated, however, that
the remedy might be appropriate in a "case of flagrant or deliber-
ate disregard of the court's authority, [if] the court made a finding
of willful refusal to comply with its order."' 35
The readiness of the Fourth District to levy harsh sanctions
for the failure to comply with discovery procedures seems a likely
harbinger of future decisions. An examination of the proposals
pending before the Civil Procedure Rules Committee reveals that
mandatory awards of attorney's fees and other more serious sanc-
tions are under careful consideration and soon may be adopted by
the Supreme Court of Florida.336
330. See, e.g., Turner v. Anderson, 376 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Rodriguez, 357 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (severe sanctions should be imposed
only in extreme circumstances for flagrant disobedience).
331. 385 So. 2d at 113.
332. Id. at 114.
333. 379 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
334. Id. at 683.
335. Id. at 683 n.1.
336. See CivnL PROCEDURE RULES COMMrIrEE, THE FLORIDA BAR, REPORT OF SUB-COM-
MrTEE ON ABUSwE DISCOVERY (May 12, 1981).
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IX. DISMISSALS
A. Voluntary Dismissals
Courts continue to interpret literally the provisions of rule
1.420(a) governing voluntary dismissals: a plaintiff has an absolute
right to take a voluntary dismissal at any time before a hearing on
a motion for summary judgment, retirement of the jury, or submis-
sion of the case to the court in a nonjury action.3 37 The District
Court of Appeal, Second District, recently reaffirmed this position
in Ambassador Insurance Co. v. Highlands General Hospital,"8 in
which the insurance company sued the hospital to recover premi-
ums on an insurance policy. The hospital moved to dismiss on the
ground that the plaintiff, a foreign corporation, was not qualified
to do business in the state. The trial court dismissed the complaint
without prejudice and allowed the plaintiff sixty days within which
to register with the Department of State. The corporation made no
effort to qualify within the sixty-day period, but two years later
filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice. The trial
court granted the hospital's motion to strike the notice. The Sec-
ond Districtreversed on appeal, stating that "[e]ven though [the
plaintiff] made no showing that it had ever taken the steps neces-
sary to qualify, the court never entered an order of dismissal. Con-
sequently, the case remained pending, and [the plaintiff] had the
absolute right to file a voluntary dismissal." 3 9
Once a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an action, however, he
cannot proceed in a second lawsuit based on the same claim until
he pays the costs awarded in the first lawsuit. In Field v. Nelson,840
the District Court of Appeal, Second District, considered whether
the trial court had the discretion under rule 1.240(d) to defer the
collection of costs assessed in a previous action that the plaintiff
had voluntarily dismissed. After the plaintiff in Field filed a sec-
ond complaint, the defendants filed a motion for payment of the
costs assessed in the initial action and a motion to stay the second
action until the plaintiff satisfied the order. The trial judge or-
dered the plaintiff to pay the costs but deferred collection until the
conclusion of the second suit. On appeal, the Second District held
that under rule 1.420(d) the trial judge did not have the discretion
either to defer the collection of costs or to refuse a motion to stay
337. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(1).
338. 383 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 389 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1980).
339. 383 So. 2d at 256.
340. 380 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
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the second action pending payment.3 4
B. Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute
Rule 1.420(e) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, which
governs dismissals for failure to prosecute, 42 has been a constant
source of concern to the courts and the Civil Procedure Rules
Committee. 4 s Rule 1.420(e) presently requires the dismissal of any
action
in which it appears on the face of the record that no actitivy
... has occurred for a period of one year. . . unless a stipula-
tion staying the action is approved by the court or a stay order
has been filed or a party shows good cause in writing . . . why
the action should remain pending. 44
The focal point of the continuing controversy over the rule is the
issue whether nonrecord, as well as record, activity can toll the
rule's one-year time period. Notwithstanding the repeated efforts
of the Supreme Court of Florida to lay this question to rest, 45 the
district courts of appeal continue to read meaning into the rule's
language that is neither present nor intended.
Before 1976 trial courts considered both record and nonrecord
activity in determining whether to dismiss an action for want of
prosecution., 6 In 1976, however, the supreme court amended rule
1.420(e) to eliminate nonrecord activity as a basis for tolling the
rule's one-year time period. 47 As amended, rule 1.420(e) permitted
courts to consider only activity that "appears on the face of the
341. The court noted that FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(d) is almost a verbatim adaptation of
FED. R. Civ. P. 41(d). The sole difference is that the federal rule provides that the trial
judge may stay the proceedings while the Florida rule provides that the trial judge shall
stay the proceedings. 380 So. 2d at 547-48. In failing to adhere to rule 1.420(d), the trial
judge had "frustrated the purpose behind the rule and deviated from [its] mandatory lan-
guage." Id. at 548.
342. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e) originated from FLA. STAT. § 45.19(1) (1965) (repealed
1967).
343. The Supreme Court of Florida has amended FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e) three times
since 1966. See In re Rules of Civil Procedure, 391 So. 2d 165, 173 (Fla. 1980); In re The
Florida Bar, Rules of Civil Procedure, 339 So. 2d 626, 629 (Fla. 1976); In re Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure, 211 So. 2d 206, 207 (Fla. 1968).
344. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e).
345. See note 330 supra.
346. See, e.g., Musselman Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Radziwon, 263 So. 2d 221 (Fla.
1972) (defense counsel mailed copies of exhibits to plaintiff's counsel); Dukes v. Chemicals,
Inc., 277 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 283 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1973) (plaintiff's coun-
sel made oral discovery request).
347. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e), Committee Note (1976).
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record. 348 The amendment retained the "good cause" defense to
dismissals, but presumably only to permit evidence of nonrecord
activity related to extraordinary events that occurred immediately
before the end of the one-year period. The rule now countenances
only those events that actually prevent record activity, such as the
illness or death of an attorney or party. 4 9 Nevertheless, the Dis-
trict Courts of Appeal for the Second and Fourth Districts have
broadly construed the good cause exception to justify considering
ordinary nonrecord activity, effectively rewriting the plain lan-
guage of rule 1.420(e).
In American Eastern Corp. v. Henry Blanton, Inc.,a10 the Sec-
ond District liberally interpreted the 1976 amendment to rule
1.420(e), concluding that the purpose of the amendment was
merely "to eliminate most nonrecord activity of the type recog-
nized prior to the amendment as a basis to establish good cause
... "3So Relying on the retention of the good cause defense in the
1976 amendment, and on the Fourth District case of F.M.C. Corp.
v. Chatman,852 the Second District receded from the position it
had taken in a previous case in which it had strictly construed rule
348. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e).
349. The committee note to the 1976 amendment to FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e) that ap-
pears in THE FLORIDA BAR, FLORIDA RuLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 45 (1981) explains the pur-
pose of the amendment as follows:
Subdivision (e) is amended to eliminate nonrecord activity as a basis for retain-
ing the action on the docket. The last sentence is added to preclude dismissal
before one year on the basis of inherent power. The good cause requirement
remains to cover extraordinary situations, such as illness or death immediately
before the expiration of the one year when activity would have been undertaken
in the absence of the extraordinary circumstance.
Id. The committee note, as it appeared in In re The Florida Bar, Rules of Civil Procedure,
339 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1976), says only that "[slubdivision (e) has been amended to prevent
the dismissal of an action for inactivity alone unless one year has elapsed since the occur-
rence of activity of record. Non-record activity will not toll the one year time period." Id. at
629 (emphasis in original).
350. 382 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
351. Id. at 865 (emphasis added). The defendants had conceded their liability on a
promissory note. Relying on defense counsel's repeated representations that the defendants
would pay their obligation, the plaintiff had delayed moving for entry of final judgment.
352. 368 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1979). In F.M.C.
Corp., the Fourth District reasoned that the failure to consider nonrecord activity "would
render the excerpt from the rule 'unless a party shows good cause,' mere surplusage." Id. at
1308 (ellipses omitted). The court concluded, however, that nonrecord conferences between
the plaintiff's attorney, his client, and potential witnesses were not sufficient activity to con-
stitute good cause. Rather, "good cause must include contact with the opposing party and
some form of excusable conduct or happening which arises other than by negligence or inat-
tention to pleading deadlines." Id. (emphasis in original).
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1.420(e).153 The court in American Eastern did suggest that the
"standard in determining whether particular nonrecord activity
constitutes good cause must be set high,"5 4 and that a party would
now be required to show "a compelling reason to avoid dismissal
where there has been no record activity."355 Nonetheless, both
American Eastern and F.M.C. Corp. construe rule 1.420(e) too lib-
erally because they fail to limit the good cause exception to ex-
traordinary circumstances that prevent record activity.
Barnes v. Ross,s5 on the other hand, may represent the type
of situation contemplated by the 1976 amendment's retention of
the good cause exception. In Barnes the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, held that a disabling injury that had prevented a
sole practitioner from practicing law for one-third of the year con-
stituted good cause to deny a motion to dismiss one of the practi-
tioner's cases for want of prosecution.35 7 The court, however, relied
on a series of earlier decisions that did not detail the extent of the
injuries and illnesses, 58 as well as American Eastern e59 and F.M.C.
353. In Sainer Constructors, Inc. v. Pasco County School Board, 349 So. 2d 1212 (Fla.
2d DCA 1977), the Second District stated that under the 1976 amendment to FLA. R. Ctv. P.
1.420(e), nonrecord activity could not be a good cause defense against dismissal. Id. at 1214
(dictum).
354. 382 So. 2d at 865.
355. Id. The court listed a number of occurrences that would not constitute "good
cause" under the rule's new standard:
Thus, some examples of nonrecord activity formerly accepted as good cause
which will no longer suffice to avoid dismissal for want of prosecution are: de-
fense counsel's mailing to plaintiff's counsel of photographic copies of exhibits,
Musselman Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Radziwon, 263 So.2d 221 (Fla. 1972); the
furnishing of a medical report by plaintiffs in accordance with defendants' spe-
cific directions, Eddings v. Davidson, 302 So.2d 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); a ver-
bal request by plaintiff's counsel to produce certain logs and records, Dukes v.
Chemicals, Inc., 277 So.2d 298 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 283 So.2d 560 (Fla.
1973); and correspondence between the attorneys requesting cancelled checks
and check stubs, Whitney v. Whitney, 241 So.2d 436 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970), cert.
denied, 245 So.2d 88 (Fla. 1971).
Id. at 865 n.2.
356. 386 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
357. Id. at 814. The practitioner was not, however, disabled immediately before the
expiration of the one-year time period. For this reason, his injury probably would not con-
stitute good cause under a strict reading of FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e). Evidence showing that
the defense counsel failed to return the attorney's telephone calls may have influenced the
court, although it expressly declined to decide whether the nonrecord activity constituted
good cause. Id. at 814 n.3.
358. Chrysler Leasing Corp. v. Passacantilli, 259 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972); Douglas v. Eirik-
sson, 347 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1977); Eli Einbinder,
Inc. v. Miami Crystal Ice Co., 317 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
359. 382 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); see text accompanying notes 337-42 supra.
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Corp.360
Although controversy still exists in Florida regarding the non-
record activity that will toll rule 1.420(e), the courts agree that
trial judges do not have the discretion to dismiss actions for failure
to prosecute when there has been any record activity directed to-
wards the disposition of pending actions within one year.361 Before
1976, the district courts of appeal had recognized an inherent
power in trial judges to control their dockets and to dismiss a case
for lack of prosecution, even if the one-year period had not run.8 '1
The 1976 amendment, however, limited the court's discretion by
barring dismissals for inactivity alone, unless there was no record
activity for one year. 8s Likewise, it also seems well-settled that the
activity of record need not be by the plaintiff.3" Rather, activity
by any party is sufficient to toll the time period if it is an affirma-
tive act directed towards the disposition of the case and not "a
mere passive effort." 55
In 1980 the supreme court again amended rule 1.420(e) to per-
mit courts to file a stay order or approve a stipulation staying an
action when it would be appropriate for an inactive case to remain
pending for more than a year. 66 This amendment removes the
need for reliance on the good cause exception to rectify the kind of
inequity that the court addressed in Estate of Mills v. Florida In-
360. 368 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
361. Bair v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 387 So. 2d 517, 518 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
362. See, e.g., Reddish v. Forlines, 207 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968):
The rule does not mean nor should it be so construed to hold, that the trial
court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, is without power or jurisdiction to
dismiss an action under proper circumstances because of the failure of plaintiff
to prosecute it with due diligence, even though affirmative action has been taken
in the case within a period of one year prior to its dismissal.
Id. at 706. See also Shalabey v. Memorial Hosp., 253 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971); Maloy
v. Bristow, 138 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962).
363. Since 1976, FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e) has precluded courts from considering a mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to prosecute before a year of record inactivity has elapsed.
364. See Barnes v. Ross, 386 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). In Barnes, the court ob-
served that any record activity "will automatically preclude a dismissal for failure to prose-
cute." Id. at 814 n.3. Furthermore, "almost total inactivity is countenanced under the rule."
Id. at 814. For a discussion of Barnes, see notes 343-47 and accompanying text supra.
365. Harris v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 378 So. 2d 90, 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). It should
be noted that courts have the power to examine record activity to determine whether the
activity is calculated to lead to the case's disposition or is merely a token effort to avoid
dismissal for failure to prosecute. Id. at 94. See also Biscayne Constr. Co. v. Metropolitan
Dade County, 388 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (issuance of third-party summons suffi-
cient to preclude dismissal); Bair v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 387 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1980) (court-approved stipulation authorizing submission of amended complaint held
sufficient to preclude dismissal although complaint never filed).
366. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e) (amended in 391 So. 2d 165, 173 (Fla. 1980)).
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surance Guaranty Ass'n.367 In Mills, the defendant moved under
rule 1.420(e) to dismiss the plaintiff's action for contribution. The
trial judge denied the motion on the ground that the plaintiff did
not need to pursue the contribution action until the court deter-
mined the underlying claim.3 68 The contribution claim was later
transferred to a second judge, who dismissed the case because it
had been inactive for over a year. The District Court of Appeal,
Third District, reversed, concluding that the plaintiff's reliance on
the first judge's ruling was good cause and excused the record inac-
tivity.36 9 The 1980 amendment to rule 1.420(e) enables courts to
prevent this kind of situation from arising and to save the good
cause defense for extraordinary occurrences.
In summary, rule 1.420(e) is intended to require the dismissal
of any action that a plaintiff has failed to prosecute through an
affirmative act of record for a period of one year, unless the court
has entered a stay order or an extraordinary event has occurred
toward the end of the one-year period. Future cases will resolve the
question whether the courts will adhere to the purpose of the rule,
or whether the Second and Fourth Districts'3 70 broad construction
will prevail.
X. PRETRIAL
Rule 1.440(b) permits a party to "file and serve notice that the
action is at issue and ready to be set for trial."'8 71 The notice must
specify whether or not a jury is to try the case and must estimate
the length of the trial. As amended in 1980, subsection (b) also
requires that the notice specify whether the trial will be on the
original pleadings or on pleadings filed under rule 1.110(h) subse-
quent to the entry of final judgment.3 7 2
Once the case is set for trial, a court may enter a pretrial order
367. 378 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
368. Id. at 302.
369. Id.
370. See text accompanying notes 350-55 supra.
371. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.440(b). "An action is at issue after any motions directed to the
last pleading served have been disposed of or, if no such motions are served, 20 days after
service of the last pleading." FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.440(a). The court cannot conduct a pretrial
conference until the action is at issue. FLA R. Civ. P. 1.200(a).
372. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.440(b). The supreme court added subdivision (h) to rule 1.110 in
1971 to cover situations usually arising in divorce judgment modifications, supplemental de-
claratory relief actions, or trust accountings in which the proceedings subsequent to final
judgment raise issues of fact requiring supplemental pleadings. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(h),
Committee Note.
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requiring the parties to exchange a catalog containing the names
and addresses of all witnesses the parties intend to call.87 3 In the
absence of a specific order, however, neither party must file a cata-
log and the trial court cannot exclude a party's witness.3 74 Simi-
larly, a trial court has no authority to prevent an unlisted impeach-
ment witness from testifying if the court's pretrial order requiring
the exchange of witness lists specifically excludes the identification
of impeachment witnesses.s37 In these circumstances, if the wit-
ness's testimony involves a critical issue in the case, the exclusion
of the testimony constitutes reversible error. 876
XI. CONTINUANCES
Prior to the 1980 revisions to the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, rule 1.460 required parties to move for a continuance in writ-
ing377 "before or at the time the case is set for trial. 37 8 As
amended in 1980, the rule now permits parties to request a contin-
uance whenever necessary, and authorizes oral motions if the par-
ties are before the court.3 79 Any motion must, however, set forth all
of the facts entitling the movant to the continuance. If based on
the nonavailability of a witness, the motion must disclose when the
witness will be available. 80
Two 1980 appellate court decisions demonstrate the broad dis-
cretion afforded trial judges who rule on motions requesting a con-
373. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200(c).
374. See Lanai Dev. Corp. v. Berry, 373 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). But cf. Fuller v.
Rinebolt, 382 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (trial court has broad discretion in determin-
ing whether to allow a witness to testify when opposing party did not have prior notice of
witness's identity).
375. Mall Motel Corp. v. Wayside Restaurants, Inc., 377 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
In Mall Motel, the pretrial order provided, in part, that the "[plarties shall furnish opposing
counsel with the written list containing the names and addresses of all witnesses intended to
be called for trial, except those used for impeachment." Id. at 43.
376. Id. at 43-44 (citing FLA. STAT. § 59.041 (1977)); Lanai Dev. Corp. v. Berry, 373 So.
2d at 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
377. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.460(b), 3 FLA. STAT. 100 (1969).
378. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.460(a), 3 FLA. STAT. 100 (1969). The committee note to the 1980
amendment indicated that Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.460(a) was necessary when the procedures for
placing a case on a trial calendar were different. The law revision committee made the
change because the courts had tended to disregard the former rule. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.460,
Committee Note.
379. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.460. The supreme court also deleted subsection (c), which had
provided that "[n]o continuance shall be granted for any longer time than the ends of jus-
tice require." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.460(c), 3 FLA. STAT. 100 (1969)).
380. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.460.
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tinuance based on the nonavailability of witnesses. 81 This is espe-
cially true if the moving party fails to proffer the unavailable
witness's expected testimony. In Barclay v. Rivero,382 the defen-
dants moved for a continuance moments before the trial began be-
cause their expert medical witness was scheduled to operate and
would not be available until the next day. The trial court denied
the motion but granted a brief recess to enable the defendants to
determine if the witness would be available sooner. The defendants
informed the court that the doctor could appear around noon, but
later reported that the doctor had to perform emergency surgery
and could not appear until later that afternoon. The court then
suggested that the defendants obtain a firm commitment from the
doctor, because it was not possible to delay the trial "'on a
maybe.' ,,3. When the doctor could not make the requested com-
mitment, the trial court denied the defendants' last request for a
continuance. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, af-
firmed, concluding that the order was not an abuse of discretion or
a denial of due process. 8
In Fuller v. Rinebolt,388 the defendant had subpoenaed a po-
liceman to testify at the trial. During the trial, the witness became
ill and had to leave the courthouse. Because of the witness's ab-
sence, the defendant moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied
the motion and the defendant appealed, arguing that the court
should have treated his motion for a mistrial as one for a continu-
ance. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, disagreed be-
381. Barclay v. Rivero, 388 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Fuller v. Rinebolt, 382 So.
2d 1239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
382. 388 So. 2d at 321.
383. Id. at 322. The defendants' oral motion for a continuance, however, complied with
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.460, to the extent the motion indicated when the defendants believed the
witness would be available. The appellate court noted that the defendants stated in their
original motion that the doctor was scheduled for surgery-in the early afternoon. This cast
doubt on the defendants' subsequent assertion that the doctor was responding to an emer-
gency at that time. Id. at 322 n.3. This factor alone should not have been dispositive because
the defendant may have been merely relating to the court information received from the
hospital. Moreover, the court noted the defendants' failure to compel the doctor's appear-
ance. Id. at 322 n.5. This factor also should have been immaterial because the doctor was
supposed to have been performing an operation.
384. The defendants' failure to make a proffer at the trial of the witness's expected
testimony was a key factor in the appellate court's decision to affirm. The court stated that
"[ilf a party wants the critical nature of the excluded testimony to be a factor in measuring
whether the trial court abused its discretion, then it is incumbent upon the party to make
an in-trial proffer. . . .[I]n the absence of a threshold showing of error, harm is irrelevant."
Id. at 322 n.7. Accordingly, the trial court's decision to disregard the substance of the doc-
tor's expected testimony was proper.
385. 382 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
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cause even if "the motion for mistrial was the equivalent of a mo-
tion for continuance," the trial court did not abuse its discretion." 6
The defendant had not profered the witness's expected testimony,
nor had he "made [any] showing on appeal that such a proffer
would have revealed evidence . ..not otherwise available."3  If
the denial of a motion for a continuance has not unduly prejudiced
the rights of a movant, the appellate courts probably will not upset
the trial court's ruling.
XII. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The courts are to grant a motion for summary judgment if the
pleadings, discovery, and affidavits on file show that no genuine
issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. 8 The burden is on the movant to
demonstrate through admissible evidence that summary judgment
is proper. 889 The court must resolve all factual questions in favor of
the nonmoving party and deny the motion if a disputed fact is
material.390
Because an affirmative defense raises an issue of fact, a party
moving for summary judgment must conclusively refute the de-
fense in order to prevail.3 9' Conversely, a movant who raises an
affirmative defense in a motion for summary judgment must have
previously raised the defense in his answer."'
No court should grant summary judgment for the nonmoving
386. Id. at 1240.
387. Id. at 1241.
388. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).
389. Arlen Realty, Inc. v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 386 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
390. Squitieri v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 382 So. 2d 730, 731 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). The
Fifth District reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment because the judge had
decided genuine issues of material fact. Commenting on the difficulty of obtaining summary
judgment in personal injury cases, the court stated:
[s]cores of cases . . . can be cited as authority for the proposition that summary
judgments are rarely upheld in personal injury cases because the nature of those
cases involve disputes of fact almost invariably. While we see few summary judg-
ments awarded in personal injury cases we find many properly entered in other
areas of the law such as mortgage foreclosures, suits on notes or contracts and
other cases founded upon written instruments where there are no genuine dis-
putes over material issues of fact.
Id.
391. First Independent Bank v. Stottlemyer & Shoemaker Lumber Co., 384 So. 2d 952,
954 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
392. Danford v. City of Rockledge, 387 So. 2d 968, 969-70 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (motion
for summary judgment cannot raise affirmative defenses of res judicata or release if not
raised in answer).
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party at a hearing noticed to consider the movant's motion for
summary judgment.39 A trial court cannot enter a final summary
judgment for the plaintiff when the defendant has a pending coun-
terclaim."9 4 In the latter situation, a trial court may select one of
two alternatives: (1) it can enter partial summary judgment for the
plaintiff and then take evidence on the counterclaim, or (2) it can
enter final summary judgment on the complaint and stay execution
pending the resolution of the counterclaim. 9'
Parties seeking or opposing summary judgment may submit
affidavits to prove or disprove the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Rule 1.510(e) provides that "[s]upporting and oppos-
ing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show af-
firmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to matters
stated therein." ' 6 Accordingly, affidavits that are based primarily
on speculation, surmise, and conjecture,97 on information and be-
lief rather than personal knowledge,' 9 ' or on the statements and
work product of other people,' 99 are legally insufficient to support
or create a disputed issue of fact in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment.
Rule 1.510(c) requires that the parties serve supporting affida-
vits twenty days before the hearing on a motion for summary judg-
ment. Nevertheless, in Northside Bank v. LaMelle,00 the court
held that the failure to comply with the rule was immaterial when
the same evidence was already before the court through deposi-
tions. Moreover, the court noted that the nonmoving party had
failed to file opposing affidavits.'0 1
393. Allen v. Metropolitan Dade County, 386 So. 2d 301, 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
394. Reliance Forwarding Co. v. Nilson Van & Storage, 387 So. 2d 513, 513 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1980).
395. Id.
396. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(e).
397. Morgan v. Continental Cas. Co., 382 So. 2d 351, 353 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (affidavits
recounting decedent's previous experiences piloting private aircraft).
398. Campbell v. Salman, 384 So. 2d 1331, 1333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (trial court should
have ignored defense attorney's affidavit based on his information and belief regarding af-
firmative defense of compromise and settlement).
399. Florida Power Corp. v. Zenith Indus. Co., 377 So. 2d 203, 204 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA
1979).
400. 380 So. 2d 1322, 1323 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
401. Id.
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XIII. TRIALS11
A. Nonjury Trials
There is no constitutional or statutory provision in Florida
granting an absolute right to be heard at the close of a nonjury
civil trial. Nevertheless, it may still be an abuse of discretion for a
court to deny a party the opportunity to present oral argument at
the close of trial in certain circumstances. In Pan American Engi-
neering Co. v. Poncho's Construction Co.,402 for example, after
both sides rested, the trial court granted the plaintiff fifteen days
to file a memorandum of law and summary of the evidence, and
gave the defendant fifteen days to reply. The trial court further
stated that either party could submit a written request for oral ar-
gument. The plaintiff never submitted a memorandum of law and
the defendant, therefore, never replied. Since the defendant's re-
ply-his opportunity to be heard-was contingent on the plaintiff's
actions, oral argument never occurred. The District Court of Ap-
peal, Fifth District, held that "[h]aving first announced that the
parties would be given an opportunity to present memoranda of
law and summaries of the evidence, it was error for the court to
proceed without further opportunity for [defendant] to be
heard.", 03
B. Jury Trials
In a jury trial, the trial judge has broad discretion to direct
counsel during closing argument.0 4 The appellate courts will not
reverse a judge for his directions absent some showing of an abuse
of discretion.'0 5 Trial judges also have the discretion to submit is-
sues to the jury that the parties did not raise in the pleadings. In
Dysart v. Hunt,'4 6 the District Court of Appeal, Third District, ex-
amined whether the trial judge had properly submitted to the jury
a question of monetary damages not raised in the pleadings. The
plaintiff in Dysart had prevailed in a replevin action, and then
challenged the trial judge's ruling striking that portion of the ver-
402. 387 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
403. Id. at 1054. In framing its holding, the court noted that in nonjury civil cases,
federal courts have recognized that final argument is a privilege within the court's discretion
and not a right. See, e.g., Yep v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 318 F.2d 841 (7th Cir.
1963); Peckham v. Family Loan Co., 262 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1954).
404. Beaches Hosp. v. Lee, 384 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
405. Id. at 238.
406. 383 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
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dict awarding money damages. The Third District affirmed even
though the claim for money damages was neither raised in the
pleadings nor tried by the express or implied consent of the par-
ties.10 7 The district court stated, "We commend and encourage this
practice, which, if we disagreed (as we do not) with the court's rul-
ing on the merits of the issue, would have permitted the final reso-
lution of the case without a second trial or a second appeal.'
40 8
Rule 1.431(g) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure allows a
party to move for an order authorizing interviews with jurors to
determine whether the verdict is subject to legal challenge. The
motion must identify each juror to be interviewed and the grounds
for challenging the verdict.409
In two opinions, the District Court of Appeal, Fifth District,
defined the scope of the juror interview as well as the scope of the
trial judge's discretion in supervising the interviews. In Kirkland v.
Robbins, 10 the defendants, in addition to filing a motion for remit-
titur or in the alternative for a new trial, moved to interview the
jury to determine whether the jurors had considered improper evi-
dence. The trial judge denied the defendant's motion to interview
the jurors, but was concerned about the lack of proof of the cause
of the injury in the case.41 He therefore personally conducted two
separate juror interviews after he had dismissed the jury and used
these interviews as the basis for his denial of the defendants' mo-
tions for remittitur or a new trial. The Fifth District first affirmed
the trial judge's denial of the motion to interview, stating:
If a verdict is pronounced in the presence of all jurors which
presumptively has satisfied the enlightened conscience of each
of them, it is against public policy to inquiry [sic] into the mo-
tives and influences by which their deliberations were gov-
erned .... Thus, inquiry is proper only in such cases involving
matters extrinsic to the verdict such as arrival at the verdict by
lot or quotient, improper contact with a juror or misconduct of a
juror; investigation of the subjective decision-making process of
the jury is not permissible. ....
In the case before us, counsel moved to interview the jury
based in part on an alleged consideration of improper evidence
407. Id. at 260.
408. Id. at 260 n.1.
409. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.431(g).
410. 385 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
411. Plaintiff sought, inter alia, to recover damages for a bowel and bladder condition
allegedly stemming from an automobile accident. The plaintiff's inadequate proof of causa-
tion troubled the trial judge. Id. At 695.
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of injuries. This allegation concerns the decision making process
of the jury and therefore, inquiry was not permissible."12
The court also held, however, that the trial judge erred in bas-
ing his decision to deny the defendants' motion for remittitur or a
new trial on post-trial interviews with members of the jury. The
court reasoned that:
After the jury has returned its verdict and has been discharged
and separated, it cannot be recalled to alter or amend its verdict
since the jury members lose their separate identity as a jury and
are subject to extra trial influences .... Thus, for the same
reasons, it would appear that a juror's recall of the jury delibera-
tions would also be unreliable and should not be allowed to in-
fluence the judge in his determination of the correctness of the
verdict.418
The court found that the juror interviews influenced the trial
judge's decision not to grant the motions for remittitur or new
trial, and consequently ordered a new trial on the issue of
damages.
In Sentinel Co. v. Edwards," the Fifth District found that a
trial judge's inherent power to control judicial proceedings includes
supervisory power over juror interviews. The issue arose when a
jury in a wrongful death action returned a verdict for the defen-
dant, the City of Kissimmee. The plaintiff, a newspaper publisher,
then filed a motion to interview the jurors, asserting that during
trial an alternate juror had said that the publisher would lose be-
cause the jury feared that a verdict against the city would result in
increased utility rates. The trial judge ordered an interview of the
alternate juror and subsequently announced sua sponte that he
would close the courtroom to the press and the public. The pub-
lisher appealed, contending that the closure order violated its
fundamental first amendment right of access to a judicial proceed-
ing, and that rule 1 .4 31 (g) of the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure" entitled the press to notice and a hearing before the court
could restrict such access."O
412. Id. at 695-96 (citations omitted). See also Swan v. Wisdom, 386 So. 2d 574 (Fla.
5th DCA 1980) (trial court properly denied permission to interview jurors regarding plain-
tiff's allegation that jury, which found plaintiff 90% negligent, reversed liability
percentages).
413. 385 So. 2d at 696 (citations omitted).
414. 387 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
415. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.431(g).
416. 387 So. 2d at 369.
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Recognizing the case as one of first impression,1 7 the Fifth
District stated that rule 1.431(g) does not entitle the press to no-
tice and a hearing before the closure of a civil post-trial hearing
concerning juror interviews." 8 The court then noted that although
the press and public do have a common-law right of access to judi-
cial proceedings, a trial court has the inherent power to control the
conduct of its proceedings."9 Included within that power, the court
reasoned, is the right to close juror interviews that might disclose
jury deliberations. The court stated that:
The rule limiting juror interviews is founded upon the
sound policy of preventing litigants or the public from invading
the privacy of the jury room .... Rule 1.431g), Florida Rules
of Civil Procedure, does not give the trial court additional au-
thority to close juror interviews, but sets out the heretofore in-
herent discretion to control juror interview proceedings."10
In this case, however, the court concluded that closure was unwar-
ranted because the alternate juror had not been privy to any jury
deliberations.' 2 '
XIV. VERDICTS
If the court submits to a jury two or more issues that could
decide the case, it will be impossible to identify which issues
formed the basis of the jury's general verdict. To avoid this uncer-
tainty, counsel may request a special verdict.' 2 If the court sub-
mits a general verdict form to the jury, counsel may object in order
to preserve the point for appeal. If, however, counsel has neither
requested a special verdict nor objected to the submission of a gen-
eral verdict form to the jury, then under the "two-issue rule," a
417. Id. at 370.
418. Id. at 372-73.
419. The court resolved the right to access issue from a discussion of Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), which held that the trial court has an affirmative constitu-
tional duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity in a criminal case. Thus,
judges may exclude the press and public without violating the sixth amendment's guarantee
of a public trial. See State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904
(Fla. 1977) (trial court's order restraining pretrial publicity in securities fraud case quashed
as unconstitutional); State ex rel. Gore Newspaper Co. v. Tyson, 313 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1975) (trial judge may not conduct closed divorce proceeding when sole justification is
parties' aversion to publicity).
420. 387 So. 2d at 374.
421. Id. at 375.
422. Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Scarbrough, 355 So. 2d 1181, 1186 (Fla. 1978).
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general verdict cannot be reversible error4 23
The two-issue rule, which the Supreme Court of Florida
adopted in Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Scarbrough,"2 provides that as
long as the court properly submitted any of the issues to the jury,
the reversal of a general verdict is improper because the appellant
cannot demonstrate prejudice.428 The supreme court recently reaf-
firmed the viability of the two-issue rule in Whitman v.
Castlewood International Corp.42 6 In Whitman the trial court had
instructed the jury on two alternative theories of liabil-
ity-negligence and agency. The jury then returned a general ver-
dict without identifying the basis of its verdict. The district court
of appeal ruled that the general verdict was improper because the
evidence did not support the agency theory. On appeal, the Su-
preme Court of Florida quashed the district court decision and re-
manded for reconsideration in light of the two-issue rule set forth
in Colonial Stores.4 2 7 If, on remand, the district court found that
the negligence theory was sufficient to sustain the verdict, the two-
issue rule would preclude the reversal of the general verdict be-
cause the appellant would be "unable to establish that he has been
prejudiced."4 28
Although a party's failure to properly and timely object to the
submission of a general verdict form to the jury will preclude him
from raising this issue on appeal, the party's failure to object to a
verdict that is contrary to law will not foreclose appellate review.
Such a verdict constitutes fundamental error that goes to the ulti-
mate merits of the cause of action.2 9 In Keyes Co. v. Sens, "3 the
jury found a realty firm and three of its employees jointly liable,
yet it apportioned compensatory and punitive damages among
them. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, reversed, con-
cluding that the verdicts and the judgment were contrary to law in
two respects: Because the jury found that the defendants were
jointly liable, the verdict was against all of them and compensatory
damages could not be apportioned. Since the defendant realty firm
was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, its liability
for compensatory damages could not exceed the compensatory
423. 355 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1978).
424. Id.
425. Id. at 1186.
426. 383 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1980).
427. Id. at 619.
428. Id. at 619-20.
429. Keyes Co. v. Sens, 382 So. 2d 1273, 1275-76 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
430. Id. at 1273.
[Vol. 35:855
CIVIL PROCEDURE
damages assessed against its employees. 1
The Third District explained the right to appellate review in
this case by distinguishing verdicts based on a fundamental error
from verdicts based on a procedural error." " Fundamental error
affects the merits of the cause of action and therefore mandates
reversal on appeal.'88 Procedural error, on the other hand, does not
mandate reversal because of the policy in favor of simplifying the
work of trial courts and limiting the scope of review.'8
XV. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Under Florida case law, a trial judge must grant a new trial if
the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. A new
trial is also appropriate if extraordinary considerations or mislead-
ing evidence have unduly influenced the jury.' 5 A trial judge, how-
ever, has broad discretion in determining whether those factors ex-
ist 6 because he is best able to understand how the jurors reached
their ultimate decision. " 7
Accordingly, a "reasonableness" standard limits the scope of
review of a trial court's grant or denial of a new trial."' In Baptist
Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bell,48 9 the Supreme Court of Florida
held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he
granted a new trial on the issue of damages. The court upheld the
trial judge's decision that the verdict was grossly excessive, even
though reasonable men might have reached different conclu-
sions.4 4 0 The court stated:
431. Id. at 1275. The court did note, however, that it is legally permissible to assess
different punitive damages against each of the defendants. Id.
432. Id. at 1276.
433. Id.
434. 355 So. 2d at 1186.
435. Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 434 (Fla. 1978); Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So.
2d 669, 673 (Fla. 1959); Haindel v. Paterno, 388 So. 2d 235, 236-37 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
436. Baptist Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bell, 384 So. 2d 145, 146 (Fla. 1980); Castlewood
Int'l Corp. v. LaFleur, 322 So. 2d 520, 522 (Fla. 1975); Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So. 2d at 673.
437. 384 So. 2d at 146.
438. Miller v. Dade County, 382 So. 2d 851, 852 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (decision to grant a
new trial affirmed because inflammatory statements concerning matters outside the record
may have influenced verdict); Mahan v. Parliament Ins. Co., 382 So. 2d 402, 404 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1980) (denial of motion for new trial affirmed because trial judge found that witness
had not committed perjury, despite allegations to the contrary).
439. 384 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1980).
440. The trial judge concluded that the following factors warranted a new trial:
(1) the size of the verdict was grossly excessive and shocked the conscience of
the court; (2) the verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence; (3)
the jury considered matters outside the record, including the amount of taxes
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In -reviewing this type of discretionary act of the trial court,
the appellate court should apply the reasonableness test to de-
termine whether the trial judge abused his discretion. If reason-
able men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by
the trial court, then the action is not unreasonable and there can
be no finding of an abuse of discretion. . . . [T]he ruling should
not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing that it has
been abused .... 441
In order to facilitate appellate review, the trial court must ar-
ticulate the specific grounds that justifed granting a new trial.44 2 If
a party appeals from an order that does not identify the specific
grounds, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530(f) provides that the
appellate court must direct the trial court to enter an appropriate
order.'4 ' Although the rule does not address the question, Florida
appellate decisions indicate that trial judges must also specify the
reasons for denying motions for new trials."'
A trial court's failure to act sua sponte to correct harmless
errors committed during the trial that counsel has overlooked is
not a ground for a new trial."" It is the attorneys' function to call
the court's attention to the error during the trial. This affords the
trial court an opportunity to rectify the problem promptly and ob-
viates the need for a new trial."' In Saunder v. Smith," 7 the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, carried this rationale a step
further. During voir dire examination, the trial court sustained the
plaintiff's objections to the defense counsel's prejudicial remarks.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff made no timely request for curative in-
which might have to be paid on the jury verdict, the amount of attorney's fees,
and the amount of other costs and expenses; and (4) plaintiff's counsel had made
an improper "Golden Rule" argument in his closing argument.
Id. at 145. For another case discussing when a jury damage award should be modified, see
Daniels v. Weiss, 385 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
441. 384 So. 2d at 146 (citation omitted).
442. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.530(f); see Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 435 (Fla.
1978); Haindel v. Paterno, 388 So. 2d 235, 237 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
443. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.530(f).
444. See, e.g., Action Fire Safety Equip. Co. v. Biscayne Fire Equip. Co., 383 So. 2d
969, 973 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (denial of motion for new trial based on new evidence not
reviewable because trial court failed to indicate whether the evidence would change jury's
verdict or was merely cumulative or impeaching).
445. Diaz v. Rodriguez, 384 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (attempt to raise court's
error after trial is untimely, even though error allegedly kept relevant evidence from jury);
Bishop v. Watson, 367 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (plaintiffs failure to object to defen-
dant's remarks and trial court's failure to admonish defendant or instruct jury to disregard
remarks was not legal basis to set aside verdict and grant a new trial).
446. Diaz v. Rodriguez, 384 So. 2d at 907.
447. 382 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
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structions or a mistrial. After entering judgment for the defendant,
the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for a new trial because
the court should have stricken the voir dire statements. The
Fourth District reversed and remanded with instructions to rein-
state the jury verdict, holding:
The court below felt that it had erred in not acting on its
own motion to strike the improper statements to which it had
already sustained an objection. We find this to be an unreason-
able view of the responsibility of the trial court. The failure on
the part of counsel to ask for curative instructions, request a
mistrial, or to move for a new venire constituted intentional trial
tactics, mistakes of which are not to be cured upon appeal sim-
ply because they backfired.44
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530(b) provides in part that
a losing party can serve a motion for a new trial within ten days
after the jury's rendition of the verdict or the entry of judgment in
a nonjury action.449 Moreover, rule 1.090(b) prohibits a trial court
from extending the time for making a motion.4 " The court does
have the discretion, however, to permit a party to amend a timely
motion in order to state new grounds for a new trial.45 '
XVI. JUDGMENTS
Rule 1.010. of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure mandates
that the rules "be construed to secure the just, speedy and inex-
pensive determination of every action.' '452 In furtherance of this
emphasis on efficiency, rule 1.442 encourages defendants to settle
meritorious claims and shifts the financial burden of proceeding to
trial to the claimant if the defendant makes an appropriate of-
fer.453 Specifically, rule 1.442 authorizes the defendant to serve an
offer of judgment ten or more days before the trial begins. 4" The
rule can thus be a useful device for the pretrial disposition of cases.
The 1980 revision to rule 1.442 goes beyond the efficiency pur-
448. Id. at 1255-56. One judge dissented, stating that the plaintiff's failure to request a
curative instruction or move for a mistrial should not have prevented the trial judge from
granting a new trial if improper considerations had influenced the jury. Id. at 1257.
449. The ten-day time limit of FLA. R. Cxv. P. 1.530(b) also applies to motions for a
rehearing.
450. See Feinberg v. Feinberg, 384 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
451. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.530(b).
452. FLA. R. Cxv. P. 1.010.
453. Wisconsin Life Ins. Co. v. Sills, 368 So. 2d 920, 922 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
454. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442.
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pose of rule 1.010 and furthers the "just" determination of every
action by providing that "[a]n offer of judgment shall not be filed
unless accepted or until final judgment is rendered."" 5 This re-
quirement avoids the possibility that a unilateral offer of judgment
filed before trial will bias a judge. The amended rule also exempts
from its coverage certain domestic relations matters related to di-
vorce, alimony, nonsupport, or child custody.45 Because the nature
of domestic matters, especially child custody cases, makes it diffi-
cult to determine whether an offer of judgment would be more
favorable to the claimant, 57 rule 1.442 appropriately does not ap-
ply to these matters.
Rule 1.580 also serves the dual goals of efficiency and justice.
This rule, which sets forth the procedures for a writ of possession,
was substantially reworded in 1980 to eliminate the anachronistic
distinction between writs of assistance and possession. This dis-
tinction has not been meaningful since the consolidation of law
and equity in Florida, and its retention until 1980 was merely an
oversight. " The most significant change in rule 1.580, however, is
the shifting of the burden of proof of entitlement in third-party
claims. In a seemingly more equitable approach, the burden shifts
from the person causing the execution of the writ to the third
party who is in possession of the property and is contesting the
execution of the writ.'59
One rule of procedure that clearly promotes the speedy and
inexpensive determination of actions is rule 1.160, which autho-
rizes a court clerk to grant motions and applications for entering
defaults and other process.'6 0 To prevent injustice, however, this
rule must be adhered to literally."61 In Ferlita v. State,4"' the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Second District, addressed the issue of
whether "substantial compliance" with the provisions of section
903.27 of the Florida Statutes,' 3 which authorizes the clerk of the
court to enter judgments against bail bondsmen, was sufficient to
justify the clerk's entry of judgment. The court analogized the en-
try of judgment under section 903.27 to a clerk's capacity to enter
455. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442.
456. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442, Committee Note.
457. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442, Committee Note.
458. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.580, Committee Note.
459. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.580, Committee Note.
460. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.160.
461. See Ferlita v. State, 380 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
462. 380 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
463. FLA. STAT. § 903.27 (1979) (amended 1981).
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default judgments. Noting that a clerk acts "in a purely ministerial
capacity and has no discretion to pass upon the sufficiency of docu-
ments presented for filing,' '464 the court concluded that "literal ad-
herence is required when a statute spells out the steps to be taken
before the clerk of the court is authorized to enter a judgment.' 4
A case that illustrates the interrelationship between the Flor-
ida Rules of Civil Procedure and the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure is Dibble v. Dibble.'" In Dibble the District Court of
Appeal, Third District, considered whether the definition of "ren-
dition" under appellate rule 9.020(g) applies to civil procedure rule
1.530(b) so as to alter the time requirements for a motion for re-
hearing. Rule 9.020(g) defines "rendition" as "the filing of a signed,
written order with the clerk of the lower tribunal."1'46 This defini-
tion, which contains no recording requirement, is in apparent con-
flict with rule 1.530(b), which requires a party to serve a motion for
rehearing "not later than 10 days after . .. the entry of judg-
ment."'' 8 The court held that the definition does alter the time
requirements of rule 1.530(b), and therefore a motion for rehearing
not served within ten days after judgment is untimely. In so hold-
ing, the court stated that the absence of a specific definition of
"entry" in either set of rules necessitates reliance on the supreme
court's definition of "rendition" in appellate rule 9.020(g). 6'9 The
court further stated that "[t]his result is required by the doctrine
that rules promulgated by the supreme court which deal with the
same subject matter should be construed together and in the light
of each other.' '470 Accordingly, rendition occurs when a party files a
final judgment with the clerk of the court, and this filing may be
equated with an entry.
The form of rules of procedure, as well as their substance, can
contribute to the efficient and inexpensive determination of a
cause of action. The 1980 amendment to rule 1.570, which governs
the enforcement of judgments, exemplifies the Civil Procedure
Rules Committee's goal of attaining clarity of form and struc-
ture. 47 1 Although substantively the same, the rule has been divided
into four subsections and amended, as the Committee Note ex-
464. 380 So. 2d at 1119.
465. Id.
466. 377 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
467. FLA. R. App. P. 9.020(g).
468. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.530(b) (emphasis added).
469. 377 So. 2d at 1003.
470. Id.
471. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.570.
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pressly states, for the purpose of making it more readily
understood.472
XVII. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, ORDER, OR DECREE
Once an order becomes final, a court cannot amend, alter, or
modify its provisions unless authorized by statute or rule. 73 One
such rule is rule 1.540 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. A
party may move for relief from a final judgment, order, or decree
under rule 1.540(a) on the ground of clerical mistake, 74 or under
1.540(b) on the ground of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excus-
able neglect, fraud, or newly discovered evidence. 4" The rule con-
templates errors such as the honest and inadvertent mistakes that
courts and parties make in the ordinary course of litigation.
Subsection (a) provides relief from clerical mistake by author-
izing the court to correct technical errors in the record that are not
the fault of the moving party or the result of judicial error. Relief
therefore is proper when the court has incorrectly dated an order' 6
or failed to assess costs. 477 Relief is inappropriate, however, when
the asserted error is substantive. In McKibben v. Fujarek4 78 for
example, the plaintiffs had initially filed two actions in different
countries, and then voluntarily dismissed one of the actions with
prejudice. Over a year later, in an attempt to avoid the res judicata
effect of the dismissal, the plaintiffs moved to amend the notice to
delete the words "with prejudice," claiming that they had included
the words in the notice inadvertently. 479 The trial court granted
the plaintiffs leave to amend. On appeal, the District Court of Ap-
peal, Fourth District, quashed the amended notice after concluding
that rule 1.540(a) only authorizes a court to correct technical errors
that result from an accidental oversight or omission.4 8 0 Not only
472. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.570, Committee Note.
473. De Filippis v. De Filippis, 378 So. 2d 325, 327 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). A court does,
however, retain the power to alter the time and manner of enforcement. Id.
474. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(a).
475. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b). Subsection (b) also permits relief when "the judgment or
decree is void; . . . the judgment or decree has been satisfied, released or discharged or a
prior judgment or decree upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated or it
is no longer equitable that the judgment or decree should have prospective application."
476. Bartlett & Sons Co. v. Pan-American Studios, Inc., 144 Fla. 531, 198 So. 195
(1940).
477. Winters v. Parks, 91 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1956).
478. 385 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
479. Id.
480. Id. at 725. The trial court's action exceeded the power conferred by the rule when
it went beyond the mere correction of a technical error and actually modified the substance
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was there no evidence of a technical error, but the requested revi-
sion would actually modify the substance of the order. Since the
error was substantive rather than technical, relief under rule
1.540(a) was inappropriate.""1
Mistakes other than clerical errors and omissions can be reme-
died under rule 1.540(b). Thus, relief is proper when the court has
inadvertently signed an incorrect order or has entered final judg-
ment under the mistaken belief that the defendant is in default. 82
Conversely, courts have denied relief when the request is based on
a substantive mistake of fact made by a witness during testi-
mony,83 when a party has failed to comprehend the effect of ser-
vice of process,484 and when a subsequent change in the substan-
tive law might justify an affirmative defense that was not raised in
the pleadings385
Trial judges have broad discretion in determining whether the
facts of a case justify relief under subsection (b) of rule 1.540, and
reversal requires a showing of gross abuse of discretion. 48  In
Church v. Strickland,87 for example, the District Court of Appeal,
Fifth District, affirmed a trial court's order setting aside a sum-
mary judgment on the ground that defense counsel's neglect was
excusable and thus warranted relief under rule 1.540(b). In Church
the defendant retained a new attorney after his first attorney died
midway through the litigation. The second attorney relied on the
first attorney's handwritten notations indicating that certain alle-
gations in the complaint had been denied when, in fact, the defen-
dant had admitted them in the answer. The trial court found that
of the record.
481. As the court noted, the proper device for obtaining relief from mistake, inadver-
tence, or excusable neglect of counsel is FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b). Relief, however, may not be
obtained more than one year from the date of entry of the judgment, decree, or order. In
contrast, relief under FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(a) may be obtained at any time. FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.540(b) would have precluded the plaintiffs from obtaining relief, because they filed their
motion to amend more than one year after the entry of the order of dismissal with
prejudice. Counsel probably sought relief under 1.540(a) as his only avenue. The court prop-
erly denied relief, but overlooked this important point. Id. at 725.
482. Viking Gen. Corp. v. Diversified Mortgage Inv., 387 So. 2d 983, 985 (Fla. 2d DCA
1980).
483. In Viking the court stated that a diligent party may always obtain relief pursuant
to "newly discovered evidence" as provided by Rule 1.540(b)(2), but that "the necessary
finality of litigation prohibits . . . a second chance at proof they had available in the first
instance but overlooked .... " Id. at 986.
484. John Crescent, Inc. v. Schwartz, 382 So. 2d 384, 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
485. Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 379 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
486. Church v. Strickland, 382 So. 2d 419, 421 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
487. Id.
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the second attorney's error constituted excusable neglect and set
aside the summary judgment it had entered in favor of the plain-
tiff. Noting that excusable neglect is a question of fact, the court
stated:
A motion filed under Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.540 is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court .... It is
the duty of the trial court, not the appellate court, to make the
determination whether the facts constitute excusable neglect,
mistake, or inadvertence within the rules. . . . This discretion is
of the broadest scope. 88
One judge dissented, however, finding the attorney's neglect so
egregious as to preclude relief from the judgment.48 9
488. Id. at 420.
489. Id. at 421.
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